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1Introduction
This text is a combination of two analyses of the attitudes of the Bulgarians ten
years after the beginning of systemic change in the country. It is a combination of the
points of view of a sociologists and of an economist.
The main goal of the analyses is to establish some specific patterns in the
Bulgarian society which may be more fundamental than the ones enjoying the attention
of more traditional and usual analyses of “the Bulgarians” and their attitudes. Namely,
the research is looking at measures and at determinants of more fundamental concepts
such as regime support at two levels, market thinking, cooperative thinking.
As the first chapter demonstrates, the analysis of more fundamental attitudes
from a sociological and political science point of view is a well developed process,
which is subject of a significant literature and whose procedures are established well
enough to allow for formulation and testing of specific hypotheses. The hypotheses are
elaborated using the Bulgarian context, and then are formulated in a way allowing for
empirical investigation. The results of six regressions are then reported and analyzed.
This is not the case with the economic portion of the research. Economic theory,
especially neoclassical economics, is more in the habit of assuming people’s attitudes
than studying them and testing hypotheses about them. So the work here is concentrated
on the generation of relevant measures of economic attitudes, and regressions are used
only as a first check whether the measurements make sense.
The work presented here is far from exhaustive on the issues discussed. Its main
goal is to present points of view and methods of analysis which may enrich the debates
and already existing insights, as well as introduce new insights in understanding the
Bulgarian society.
Of course, we recognize the deficiencies and the limitations of many of the tools
used here. For example, the regressions used are specified ad hoc rather than by using
2elegant and formal models, and this is the reason why there may be found seemingly
contradictory results from the different specifications. Also, it is quite possible that
relevant considerations were omitted in the analysis. Despite these limitations, however,
we believe that the results clearly demonstrate the importance of our approach and hold
a significant promise for future research along these guidelines.
3Chapter 1. Determinants of Political Support in Bulgaria
It has been recognized that the Bulgarian economic transformation has started not
in 1990-1991, as it has happened in other former communist countries, but just after the
crisis of 1996/1997 when the Bulgarian reformist (neo-liberal) party (UDF) won the
elections for the second time after the beginning of radical social change. The roots of the
initiation of that political change should be searched not on the side of mobilizing
capacity of the democratic political opposition but on the side of popular will brought
about by one of the deepest economic crisis of 20th century in Bulgaria. From the point of
view of popular support for democratic changes, that positive record was due to mass
political mobilization from below.
The main peculiarity of the Bulgarian popular support was that not the
ideologically induced from above - from the political opposition - attempts for political
mobilization of 1990, but the structurally based (caused by economic factors) political
mobilization of 1997 has succeeded to change the route of the whole process of post-
communist transformation in Bulgaria. Thus, the economic but not ideological motives
were what swept away the government of the neo-communist party and brought a new
democratic government with a clearer vision for radical economic changes. These
specifics of the Bulgarian post-communist transformations require a special attention to
the development of political support in already changed economic, social and political
environment of 2000, for, it turned out that political support has quite significant role in
the Bulgarian transition after the crisis in 1996/1997. An informative study of the drives
of political support in ten years distance would be a good privileged point for delineating
the path of further post-communist transformation in the light of a new political and
economic factor such as the Euro-Atlantic perspective of integration.
1-1. Types of political support
It is widely accepted that political support is a multidimensional phenomenon
containing different levels and objects. Political commentators usually tend to forget that
distinction. Thus, support for ruling authorities is equated with support for democratic
regime itself and often some extrapolations are made that equate the decline of trust in
authority with breakdown of democracy.
4Analytical frameworks provided by David Easton continue to be at the core of that
methodological distinction. He makes a distinction between support for the regime
(diffuse support) and support for authorities (specific support). Diffuse support measures
the relations of the public to political system as a whole and political institutions of that
system, independently of individuals which run that system and institutions. The meaning
of diffuse support, according to him, refers to evaluations of what the political regime is
or represents, or to what general sense it has for a person. It consists in a reservoir of
approving attitudes that helps population to accept or tolerate outputs, which are even
damaging to their wants. Yet, outputs and authority performance may correspond or not
to individual preferences and demands while diffuse support for the regime is an enduring
"generalized attachment." (Easton, 1965). In Easton's terms, diffuse support "is not
contingent on specific incumbents or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run. On
a day-to-day basis, if there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the
authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of repeated deprivation
attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their failure to act" (Easton, 1965: 278).
Hence, a well known phenomenon is registered through the distinction between
diffuse and specific support - that members of a society might find themselves dissatisfied
with the political authorities represented by concrete persons, discontented with their life
conditions and even prepared to throw the incumbents out of office. Sometimes, such
feelings could lead to a fundamental change of entire political system. Yet, at times, there
may be a high level of confidence in the political regime itself, in spite of the widespread
discontent with the concrete authoritative rulers. This means that poor at times
performance does not weaken support for democracy (regime). (see G. Toka, 1995)
Another terminology, used for the description of the same phenomenon is Almond
and Verba "system effect" which refers to "generalized attitudes toward the system as a
whole" (Almond and Verba, 1965: 63). We can mention, also, the well defined
'alienation-allegiance' continuum of Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and Sniderman, where at
the right end of the continuum the alienated from political system are located as opposite
to the left end of the continuum in which these who feel psychologically and legally an
integral part of the political system are positioned (Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and
Sniderman, 1974: 3).
5So, political discontent has different levels, or objects, and is not always a sign of
basic political change. True, some types of people’s evaluation of political matters are
closely related to what the political authorities do and how they do it. Others are more
fundamental in character because are directed to some basic aspects of social and political
system. They can last even if people oppose the incumbents of office but yet keep respect
for the regime itself. Catching exactly that differentiation is tried by the Easton's
distinction between diffuse and specific support, or in terms of E. Muler and T. O. Jukam,
by incumbent-system distinction.(see E. Muler and T. O. Jukam, 1977: 1563)
1-2. Theoretical Discussion
(a) Economic Determinism or Political Primacy?
Attitudes of political support of population in a wider societal context are strongly
connected and dependent on the processes of democratization and economic liberalization
in a given country, or broadly speaking, on the interaction between politics and
economics.
Since 1989 Central and East European countries have been attempting to establish
simultaneously mass democracy and market economy but, at the very beginning, some
tensions between the two processes have appeared. >From that time on, different
arguments have been developed about the relationship between the economic reform and
transformational economic crisis, on one hand, and the political stability and the fate of
democracy in Eastern Europe, on the other hand. The most frequently used argument was
about the incompatibility of simultaneous economic and political transformation. The
main worry of the proponents of that argument consisted in considering the deprivation
originating in economic crisis and neo-liberal reform as the most important reason for the
erosion of democratic support. As Przeworski defined it, “the durability of the new
democracies will depend ...to a large extent on their economic performance” (Przeworski,
1991: 189). According to Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992) democratic consolidation was
supposed to be endangered by only one factor (socio-economic problems) instead of two
or three different factors (socio-economic, cultural and possibly political problems).
Economic crisis argument (or economic explanation ) was applied to the post-communist
period to elucidate an eventually diminishing support for the regime with rising
6redistributive demands and egalitarian tendencies among the population. According to
this argument, with increasing economic hardship the support for reformist governments
will decline, and consequently - the support for the democratic regime.
Thus, at the beginning of post-communist radical social change, the main anxiety
of the researchers of Eastern European transformation was that the radical economic
reforms would cause popular aversion with policy outputs which would slow down the
speed of the reform and would lead to a new wave of popular aversion with economic
policy outputs. That would cause loss of legitimacy of the ruling government, and
according to Przeworski, under some conditions this could be a serious threat to
democratic consolidation.
The Bulgarian case, however, has fulfilled only a part of that prediction. The lack
of economic reforms for almost seven years brought out a deep economic crisis, which
swept away the ruling neo-communist party in the middle of its mandate. What did
happen in Bulgaria, following the worry of the experts, was that the economic crisis
caused by the continuous lack of economic reforms diminished specific support (support
for neo-communist incumbents) but did not touch support for the new regime, that was
shown by the vote for the pro-liberal opposition. Thus, the ruling neo-communist
incumbents have paid higher price for not implementing the economic reforms than if
they would have implemented these reforms.
The Bulgarian populace has faced hardships of the economic transformation but
having as an experience the opposite to the central European post-communist countries
situation – popular aversion caused not by liberal economic reforms but by their absence.
After years of delays structural reform started in the middle of 1997 and naturally
led to increasing unemployment rate and additional economic adversity. A time has come
to suffer the negative effects of structural reform itself. Therefore, it is not difficult to
imagine a situation in which besides blaming the reformist government for constant
poverty, people could turn against the regime itself. Thus, a problem arises of gaining
popular support for the democratic regime after 10 years of hostile economic conditions.
A recent analysis, however, shows that “the now dominant political view that politics is
best approached through the economy, does not seem to help understanding how
democracies could survive even during as difficult as the post-communist
7transformational recession” (Greshkovich, 1998). Despite of the mutual interdependence
between economic and political reform, the relative autonomy of politics has to be
considered.
There are several competing hypotheses that delineate the possible development
of political support applicable to the central and eastern European post-communist
countries. The first is known as generalized trust argument vs. economic crisis argument.
According to the latter, economic crises are usually identified as the most serious
obstacles to democratic consolidation in democratizing countries. This argument could be
applied to post-communist period to elucidate an eventually diminishing support for the
regime with rising redistributive demands and egalitarian tendencies among the
population as a result of pure political outputs. The “generalized trust argument” regards
some contradictions between economic and axiological determinants of support for the
regime. According to it, regime support can be mobilized to prevent deep confrontations
between contradictory economic interests, which can endanger the survival of the whole
system. Independently of economic crisis and deterioration of living standards for the
mass population in post-communist countries, support for democracy will be still high
due to the initial reservoir of support for the new regime. Citizens may “make an
‘advanced payment’ to the reservoir of regime support on the basis of taking foreign
democracies as models, even before they experience them in their own country. In such
case, the prestige of democracy abroad is already high at a country’s own point of
transformation. Such ‘demonstration effect’ may be restricted to ‘reference groups’ of
countries” (Weil, 1989: 699-700). Hence, a threat of revival of the communist totalitarian
regime together with acceptable foreign model countries create the support reservoir of
the new democracies that could be spent in case of poor incumbent performance.
However, the honeymoon effect based on generalized trust could evaporate quite quickly
if political and economic dissatisfaction expands.
The empirical findings from the beginning of post-communist transformation in
central and eastern European countries show that support for the new regime is high due
to generalized trust in the new regime, which confirms the honeymoon period argument
(see Rose, 1998; 1999). Almost all analyses of the initial period of post-communist
transformation show that axiological determinism (or political factors) explains higher
percentage of political attitudes of support for the new regime and for reformist
8governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Some analyses of the late 1990 Bulgarian
political attitudes also support that hypothesis (Stamenova, 1999).
However, ten years time lag exists that should be explained in the light of the
events of 1997 and changed economic and political environment in Bulgaria.  What we
intend to check is whether that tendency still exists ten years after the beginning of the
radical systemic change, or some other explanations - economic or structural, have better
explaining power for the recent period.
(b) Tendencies in post-communist social structure
The second branch of theoretical questions relates to social structure, and
correspondingly, to interests formation process and is connected with the theoretical
problem of how transformative interests could be formed – as a result of economic factors
or with the help of political influence. It is well known, that the honeymoon period with
the new system at the very beginning of post-communist transformation is a time when
thinking in terms of political values prevails upon the thinking in terms of interests (see
E. Wnuk-Lipinski, 1998: ). The reality of economic and political post-communist reform
changes the mass vision of the transformation process when the ideological and
axiological thinking is substituted by reasoning in terms of interests.
The configuration of interests at the initial stage of post-communist
transformation is characterized with overspread domination of old socialist type interests,
aimed at keeping the socials statuses of huge amount of population that is defined in the
terms of the old socialist economic structure of ownership relations. They are
characterized mainly by their redistributive demands directed to the state and ruling
government.
According to E. Wnuk-Lipinski (1998), the following individual and group
strategies become possible at the beginning of the transformation period: 1/ defense of
group interests according to the logic of the old system; 2/ redefinition of group interests
and formation of new interest groups that fit to the emerging new social order, and 3/
adaptable redefinition of group interests in terms of current best available bet. These
strategies can be transmitted into political sphere and can – through political parties –
shape the speed and priorities of transformation. The first category is then natural social
base for political forces striving for a kind of restoration of the old system. The second
9category supports the completion of the change whereas the third category is
predominantly interested in the prolongation of the transitory period with its inconsistent
rules and relatively weak law-enforcement of state agencies. This segment of the society
can be called a ‘transitory class’. In some countries the transitory class is closely
connected to and mingled with criminal underground (E. Wnuk-Lipinski, 1998: 7).
Special conditions are needed in order for the old socialist type interests to be
redefined into the new economic logic. Of course, the first is building that new economic
logic – this is the radical economic reform at the very beginning of post-communist
transformation period. The postponing of the radical economic measures petrifies the first
and the third interest groups – it petrifies the old types of interests and makes possible its
articulation and representation into the political level. Additionally, the low level of law
enforcement and undefined rules of political and economic game create conditions for
petrifying and empowering the third category of “mafia” type interests that is nourished in
an environment that lacks well defined rules of the game. Z. Bauman uses Turner’s notion
of liminality to express exactly that kind of lack of clear-cut rules (Z. Bauman, 1994). The
prolongation of the liminality period makes possible political representation of the
‘mafia’ type interests through different political lobbies represented on the governmental
level. These lobbies could control to their benefit not only the economic processes in the
country, but can slow down the whole process of transformation, and could hamper the
process of defining the rules of the political and economic game.
Therefore, continuous lack of economic reforms does not give real economic
opportunities for integration of the old type of interests into the new economic logic. The
danger of petrifying that configuration of interests where the first type of interests (old
socialist ones) and the third type (’illegal’ interests) dominates upon the second (redefined
interests according to the new economic logic) is a characteristic of the Bulgarian post-
communist transformation where the liberal economic reforms were postponed for almost
seven years. According to E. Wnuk-Lipinski,
1/ The less radical is the economic change at the initial stage of post-communist
transformation, the more likely is the preservation of old definition of group interests and
– in consequence – the stronger is the social base for a kind of restoration of the old
system.
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2/ The more radical is the initial phase the more likely is social reintegration
around new definition of group interests that are redefined according to the logic of the
new system.
3/ The less radical is initial stage of transformation, the more likely it is that less
advanced changes will be institutionalized and petrified – like the third segment of group
interests (see E. Wnuk-Lipinski, 1998: 10).
On the basis of Wnuk-Lipinski’s methodological assumptions we can infer some
arguments about the Bulgarian development of the configuration of interests that,
however, are not based on systematic empirical data. Till the 1996/1997 crisis, the most
numerous segment was the first one - old socialist type of interests pretending to be
represented by the neo-communist party (BSP). At the same time, the lack of economic
reforms despite the presence of already built democratic political institutions has
generated a peculiar situation of liminality and lack of clear rules of the economic game
for years. The failure of the UDF government in 1992 put the start of an enormous
expansion and a successful political lobbing of the third ‘mafia’ type segment. During the
experts’ government of Ljuben Berov, that segment received political representation and
to a significant extent succeeded to control the whole processes of transformation on the
behalf of the ‘grey zone’ of interests. This process continued during the socialist
government of Jan Videnov (1994-1996). The clientelist party structure of the BSP
facilitated the process of using politics for clientelist acquiring of substantial private
wealth and capital accumulation by the third segment of society. Simultaneously, the
postponed economic reform did not bring out the necessary economic conditions for
redefinition of the old socialist type of interests into the new ones.
The economic crisis of 1996/1997 created a totally new situation with respect to
the old segment of interests. The crisis has shown that keeping the loss-making
enterprises under the state subsidizing was not a secure strategy for protecting previous
social statuses under conditions of state economic failure. This was the reason for loss of
‘going back’ perspective of the part of population and acceptance the new economic
perspective that has become apparent with the vote for the neo-liberal UDF party in the
1997 elections.
However, the third segment did not disappear by design. It was not by chance that
at the very beginning of its government in 1997, the government of UDF has started a
‘war’ with the ‘mafia’ type groups, trying to destroy the economic basis for their power.
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Thus, a peculiar social structure has been formed in Bulgaria during the Bulgarian
post-communist transformation with a significant segment of ‘illegal’ groups striving for
survival and trying to adapt in the new political circumstances. The survival of that
segment of society has been facilitated by the party strategy of the UDF that has begun to
build its party consolidation not as based on clear programmatic vision but on party
loyalty of its members. Thus, the clientelist trend in the Bulgaria party system has been
continued once again. The rest of the population has to meet changed environment for
reintegration in the economic system, whose rules are still in the process of
institutionalization.
Thus, a discrepancy between political and economic post-communist reforms is
the main peculiarity of the Bulgarian systemic transformation that should be taken into
account when analyzing that period.
(c) Do transformative interests exist?
The lack of transformative interest in post-communist societies at the initial stage
of the systemic change is a well known phenomenon. The main reason is the very logic of
post-communist transformation that fully depends on the political will of the ruling elite
and is driven by political and economic reform from above. In the process of economic
and political reforms, a possibility arises of a redefinition of the socialist type of interests
into the logic of the new system. A theoretical question remains of how these
transformative interests could be built when there are no economic and socio-structural
conditions for that. What lasts at the very beginning of the transformation is state owned
enterprises and social statuses, and correspondingly, interests that are in accordance with
that form of ownership. There is no middle class, and if an enbourgeoisiement is going
on, it is based on principles that do not have much in common with market ones, and
could be rather identified with the above described appearance of the third segment of
interests that hardly could be called ‘transformative’.
As a result of the economic crisis of 1996/1997 these transformative interests did
appeare on the side of the population. Therefore, we can infer that the prediction of the
experts form the early 90s that have relied on economic crisis argument, have not been
performed in the Bulgarian case. A peculiar situation was observed in Bulgaria where the
democratic pathway was chosen as a result of economic crisis. It was not by chance that
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not the values-driven symbolic political mobilization of 1990-1991, but the economic
crisis determined and led from below spontaneous mass mobilization achieved to change
the habitual attachment to communism in Bulgaria and to open the route to successful
economic transformation.
What is under question yet, is how to uphold these interests in the face of delayed
Bulgarian economic transformation and still hostile economic conditions of slowly going
structural reform. What the mass public mostly needs is a vision of the future, which will
bring out the end of seeming endless economic hardships and enormous poverty.
There are two ways of the formation of transformative interests – first, as based on
quick development of the new economic logic at the initial phase of post-communist
transformation, and second, as based on successful political (ideological) persuasion.
When the economic reform is so deferred like in the Bulgarian case, upholding of
such transformative interest goes necessarily through the ideological work of political
elite and its legitimation strategies.
Hence, the ideological production of political interests “from above” should be
considered in order to understand the formation of perception and attitudes toward
democratic regime. Here we have to add Wesolowski’s remark that without exerting a
political influence on interests formation “there can be no articulation and crystallization
of “interest” (Wesolowski, 1994: 276). Wesolowski's concept of 'transgressive interest'
defined as 'imagined' one whose existence "depends on the brightness of political
programmes offered by the elite" conceives in a best way the specifics of politically
formed interest if it is accepted form the bulk of the society (see Wesolowski, 1994). It
could appear in times of radical political and social transformations when the
modification of old interests under the new social, economic and political changes is
under way. The politically induced interests formation is a result of the ability of the
political elite to persuade the vision of future and, thus, thinking in terms of future-
oriented results1. It is called by Wesolowski "a projective articulation of the 'transgressive
interests" which have imaginative character (Wesolowski, 1994: 282). He rightly points
out that the effectiveness of the transgressive or imagined interests depends on the clarity
of the political programs of the political elite that are presented to the society.
                                                          
1 That process is based on the already explained by Bourdieu ability of politics to produce reality by
changing the perception of the world and the vision of the future reality.
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We argue that the ideological work of the political elite is able to influence
significantly the mass attitudes toward support for democracy and the economic reform.
So, one of our tasks is to elucidate the degree of that effect.
Therefore, two contradictory hypotheses will be examined in our study,
corresponding to structural vs. axiological determinants of support for democracy: is
support for democracy at the last phase of post-communist transformation in Bulgaria
guided predominantly by 'transgressive' interests, or is structurally based on the above
mentioned segments of interests. An additional effect will be also studied – that is the
economic determination.
A necessary clarification should be additionally made. We consider that although
'transgressive' or imagined interests are ideologically grounded, they are not totally
separated from pragmatism, and thus, do not have a fundamentalist character. Rather,
they could be described as future oriented pragmatic behaviour and are connected with
the image of personal and family wellbeing. Of course, the opposite variant is also
possible when the ideological motifs dominate upon the pragmatic and future oriented
interests calculations. However, that possibility is rejected by the very Bulgarian history
because fundamentalist orientations are untypical for the historically shaped national
mentality of the Bulgarians. (see N. Genchev, 1987)
1-3. Levels of Political Support
Relying on Easton’s distinction, we will study political support on two levels: 1/
as diffuse support (support for the regime itself), and 2/ as specific support  (support for
the ruling authorities).
However, additional methodological clarification should be made in order to
specify the distinction between, on the one hand, the core regime principles representing
the values of the political system, and on the other hand, evaluation of the regime
performance, meaning satisfaction with the way democracy functions in practice.
According to Pippa Norris, the latter taps a ‘middle level’ of support (Norris, 1999: 11). It
is commonly measured by ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works in a country’, that
is how democracy functions in practice as opposed to the ideal. Yet, a contradiction is
possible between values of democracy and performance of the democratic regime – one
can be supportive to democratic values yet feel that the way democracy functions in a
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country leaves much to be desired. That discrepancy is even more profound in newer
democracies such as the post-communist ones. Thus, we accept that the item of ‘how
democracy is working’ is more appropriate to test public evaluation of regime
performance than values.
Thus, we will study diffuse support or support for democracy as having two
objects – regime principles (values) and regime performance. Principles of democracy as
tapped by the analysis are chosen in order to delineate the distinction between the two
types of regimes – totalitarian and democratic. These are the items tapping democratic
values that are opposite to the communist regime  - freedom of speech; free elections;
multiparty system; need of having a parliament, rejection of the rule of a ‘strong hand’.
We argue that diffuse support should be measured through items registering the
commitment to the principles of the new regime that are distinct from the totalitarian
rather than through evaluation of regime performance.
Therefore, in the case of a young and not perfect democracy such as the one in
Bulgaria we cannot rely on evaluation of the present state of the regime as the only point
of reference for assessing the regime support. The reasons for our choice to measure the
principles of regime support are several. Firstly, the previous totalitarian regime is in the
living memory of most of the people. This fact allows a comparison with the communist
regime, which could work in two opposite directions – support for democracy in spite of
the poor regime performance, and ideological attachment to the communist regime. It is
well known that the latter is a peculiarity of the Bulgarian post-communist transition,
where a significant part of the old generation still keeps its ideological attachment to the
previous regime. The prolonged and quite painful economic transformation could work as
a comparison with relative financial security of the communist period and might add to
diminished acceptance of the new regime principles.
Secondly, a ten year period is enough neither for building a reservoir of regime
legitimacy, nor for making it as perfect as its is perceived to be in the old democracies.
Popular perception of the current status of democracy as still imperfect and in process of
development which adds to our decision to use as an indicator for support for democracy
its principles, and not only its current status.
Thus, we will use the variables describing the perception of the way democracy
works now (Q3 and q31) both as dependent and independent variables, and will make a
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comparison of determinants of the two types measuring the support for democratic
regime.
1-4. Determinants of political support – setting up the empirical work
We will consider determinants of political support as economic (depending on
economic attitudes that reflect satisfaction with the personal financial well-being, as well
as satisfaction with the current stage of economy, retrospective comparison with the past,
and future expectations), structural (membership of an individual to a certain strata of
social structure), and axiological - politically and ideologically induced attitudes either as
values, or as projective, i.e. future oriented interests.
(a) Basic questions
The main question we will try to answer is: which one of the above mentioned
determinants - the economic, the structural, or the axiological, better explains political
support in Bulgaria ten years after the beginning of the systemic change.
We will look for the sources of political support among the defined above
configuration or structure of interests in the society and the degree of success of the
legitimizing attempts of political elite.
We intend to check whether the ‘demonstration effect’ of Western democracies is
one of the core explanations of support for the regime. The mentioned factor could be
used as a rationalization for acceptance of regime measures directed against short-term
interests of individuals or social groups. What we aim to analyze further is to explain the
mechanisms making possible the existence of generalized trust based on "demonstration
effect" which goes through the issues of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Political and economic orientations towards NATO and EU membership will be
examined as having a potential for popular mobilization that is used by the governing
party. This means that the mobilizing function of orientations to NATO and EU will be
considered as an element of axiological support for the regime and for the government.
What we will look for is to what extent that part of the governmental political program is
transmitted into projective interests. We will look, also, for influence of the other
determinants (economic and socio-structural) on the EU and NATO membership issue.
16
Here, the main questions to answer are: 1/ does Euro-Atlantic integration explain higher
percentage of popular support than domestic policy and existential criteria, 2/ are
axiological motifs still at the core of support for the regime like at the very beginning of
post-communist transformation or, ten years after the start of the systemic change, socio-
structural determinants cause more significant impact upon support for democracy; 3/ is
the Euro-Atlantic perspective an element of support for the regime, or is stronger
correlated with the support for incumbents. Therefore, the mobilizing function of
orientations to European Union will be considered as an element of axiologically based
support for the regime and support for the government.
However, we should keep in mind that value-based support for democracy as a
foundation for future-oriented interests has country-specific features that influence the
later phases of post-communist transformation. The projective or transgressive interests
themselves could be based either on supportive future-directed individual and/or group's
advantages, or might be a basis for common interests formation. The whole Bulgarian
history shows that exactly the formation of a common national interest  (based on a
common national ideology) is lacking as a consequence of centuries lasting lack of a
unified ideological center and also the absence of a social stratum that could produce such
national ideology – contrary, for example, to the Polish experience. Therefore, the
possibility of symbols-based unification of the Bulgarian nation is, so to say, genetically
and thus, logically diminished. So, if there is any success in ideological persuasion of new
democratic values it is predominantly grounded in future oriented personal advantages.
The short period of symbolic political mobilization at the end of 1990 proved that the
democratic popular attitudes in Bulgaria are fragile for they could be easily shattered by
deterioration of economic situation (as the period of the UDF government in 1992
demonstrated). Thus, individual pragmatic interests drive political behavior of the
Bulgarians basically, whatever form they take in a public sphere. That fact should be
taken into account, when analyzing the axiological nature of political mobilization by
projective interests ‘form above’. Thus, axiologically based political support is not devoid
of pragmatism in the Bulgarian case, although that pragmatism is projected in the future.
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(b) Hypotheses
Despite the registered ideologically grounded support for the new democratic
regime at the beginning of the post-communist transformation in all Central and Eastern
European countries, there are significant differences in the ability of each nation, and
respectively, each political elite to invoke mass mobilization for radical economic and
political changes. The main peculiarity of the Bulgarian political support was that not the
ideologically induced from above - from the political opposition - attempt for political
mobilization of 1990, but structurally based (caused by economic factors) political
mobilization of 1997 has succeeded to change the route of the whole process of post-
communist transformation. Thus, it was economic motives that swept away the
government of the neo-communist party and brought out a new democratic government
with a clear vision for radical economic changes. Hence, pragmatically oriented political
support brought out the policy of real structural reforms in Bulgaria.
The results of the last local elections in 1999 draw only slightly changed picture of
mass political attitudes in comparison with 1997. These attitudes are characterized by
predominantly majoritarian voting for persons rather than for parties. The low level of
turnout among city-residents, highly educated, and young people shows that these parts of
society do not have the feeling that they could have a word in the process of local
decision-making. Actually, it is a sign of political demobilization among these segments
of the Bulgarian society who were the strongest supporters of liberalization and
democratization of the society during the mass political mobilization of 1997. Thus,
political demobilization and pragmatic voting are the main characteristics of the local
elections 1999. However, we cannot extrapolate these characteristics upon all levels and
objects of political support. The main feature of local elections is that usually they are
issues oriented, and could be highly politicized when there are serious shortcomings in
policy outputs on national level. Therefore, there are other factors that constitute the
public support on national level.
We will outline distinct hypotheses about the different objects and levels of
political support. We have mentioned already that we will study two levels of political
support – diffuse (support for the regime) and specific support (support for the
incumbents). We have also talked about the two objects of diffuse support – support for
the principles of democratic regime that are distinct from the totalitarian, and evaluation
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of the regime performance, tapped by the satisfaction with the way democracy works in
the country. We will study the determinants of both objects of regime support
hypothesizing that they have different sources.
The first hypothesis is connected with the influence of socio-structural
determination upon the support for democracy. We think that during the ten year
transformation period, the process of redistribution of public property into private hands
has been completed without clear and transparent economic rules to be applied. A new
social structure has appeared that varies around the mentioned above three segments of
interests. The lack of theoretical analyses based on systematically collected empirical data
about the changes in the social structure in Bulgaria does not allow us to know much
about it. Even less empirical knowledge we have about the principles of that
restructuring. What we can hypothesize, however, is that if the social distances are
deepened enough, i.e. the losers and winners of the transformation process are petrified in
particular social strata, then the support for the regime should be unevenly distributed
among distinct socio-structural characteristics. To put it differently, if the process of post-
communist social restructuring is already accomplished under non-economic criteria, then
we expect that neither legitimizing attempts of the political elite, nor the economic
determinants (as subjective perspectives for bettering of personal economic situation, and
perceived perspectives for improving of macroeconomic situation in the country)2, but
socio-structural ones will influence most strongly support for the new regime.
(Hypothesis (1a)) This means that the horizon for future bettering of personal social status
within some social strata would be perceived as closed “forever”, and then a withdrawal
from support for the new regime (measured as democratic regime performance) for these
social groups will be observed.
However, if the mobilizing and legitimizing attempts of the ruling political elite
are sufficiently effective, they would be able to form projective interests around Euro-
Atlantic integration, so support for the new regime will be based on successfully formed
transgressive (future oriented and projective) interests ‘from above’. Thus, political
determination based on generalized trust will continue to be more influential upon the
support for the new regime (Hypothesis (1b)).
                                                          
2 To some extent, we can even say that if economic determinants (expectations for bettering of one’s
economic status) are not grounded on distinct perspectives of different social groups, then they would fully
rely on the vision about the future suggested by the political elite.
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These hypotheses could be applied to both objects of diffuse support – to
principles of democracy, and also to democratic regime performance. Thus, a possibility
exists that the two objects of diffuse support could have different determinants among the
above mentioned and might be inconsistent (Hypothesis (2)).
We argue as well that the structural (economic) political mobilization in
1996/1997 has occurred as a result of generalized hope for bettering economic statuses of
the greater part of population in Bulgaria. Therefore, that mobilization could not be
characterized as caused by the structure of interests as they existed in 1996. Rather, it
produced a political action aiming at changing the rules of economic game in such a way,
which would allow a redefinition of life chances for the bulk of people and, finally, would
allow them to find their place within a new socio-economic structure. However, the
reintegration of the old socialist type of interests into the new economic logic is a lengthy
process that could not be accomplished within three years of structural reforms. To a
degree, further deterioration of the financial situation of most of the populace has
occurred that has been caused by these reforms. Thus, we suppose that the main sources
that mobilize political support will continue to be political and future oriented.
As a result of this process we expect that specific support (support for
incumbents) in Bulgaria ten years after the beginning of the systemic change will continue
to be affected mostly by politically and ideologically induced attitudes as projective, i.e.
future oriented interests based on the enforcement of the “demonstration effect” of
Western democracies through Euro-Atlantic integration perspective. Therefore, a primacy
of generalized thrust upon economic and socio-structural determination is hypothesized
(Hypothesis (3)).
We assume, also, that support for liberalization of the economy and for market
economy principles will be socio-structurally determined as well, and will outline the
main social groups (and stratificational principles) structuring support for the new socio-
economic system (Hypothesis (4)). These groups would constitute the second segment of
interests that are in accordance with the structural reforms
The next hypothesis reflects the relationships between specific and diffuse
political support. What we expect to find is a strong commitment to the new democratic
rules of the political game that already mark the point of no-return to the totalitarian
forms of political rule. This means that diffuse support (tapped as support for the
principles of the new political order) will be high and to some extent disconnected with
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the evaluation of incumbents' policy. Our Hypothesis (5) is that support for the principles
of democracy will not be correlated with support for the ruling authorities.
If the mobilizing attempts of the ruling authorities are successful, then we expect that
European Union perspective of integration would be involved within the formation of
projective interests among the population seeking to diminish the negative political
effects of economic hardships (Hypothesis (6)). Thus, we expect that both specific
support and diffuse support (both its objects) will strongly depend on the popular vision
of the Bulgarian perspectives for European Union integration (Hypothesis (7)).
We additionally expect that the perspective for NATO membership will highly depend on
specific support (Hypothesis (8)).
(c) Data and methodology
The data-source of the analysis is an empirical survey based on a representative
cluster sample of all Bulgarian population over 18 years of age that has been collected in
February 2000.  It contains of 1200 respondents.
We use multiple regression analysis in order to identify those variables (factors)
which have greatest effect on our dependent variables - support for principles of
democracy, specific support, support for economic liberalization (or inclination for
market thinking – see Chapter 2), as well as support for European union integration and
approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO.
We created, also, additive scales, used as indexes, for these dependent variables
in order to comprise bigger number of items as indicators for the mentioned synthetic
dependent variables. These additive scales are made on the basis of the Cronbach's alpha
coefficients (reliability item analysis). The received alpha coefficients are as follows:
Support for democracy index -> .69
Specific support index-> .71
Market thinking index -> .90
European Union integration index -> .92
‘NATO’ index-> .93
The variables (items) that form the complex variable of the support for democracy tested
with the help of Alpha coefficient are as follows:
Q2.1 and Q2.9  - associate democracy with:
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- political liberties e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of association?
- democracy: multi-party system
Q22 – the elections are the best way to choose government of the country
Q23 – we need a parliament;
Q30.1 – if we want a democratic development, we need political parties;
Q37 – Multi-party system is better than single party system;
Q 40 – A strong leader is more useful for the country than number of democrats.
The index of specific support contains the following variables, measuring the level of
confidence in the current authority' system:
Q12 -  satisfaction with the present government:
Q15.2  and Q21 – trust in government
Q39.2 – trust in the prime minister
Q39.3 – trust in the President
The market thinking index contains the following variables:
Q16 – citizens vs. state must pay for health care;
Q17 – there should be a limit upon the earnings of the people
Q18 – state should/should not protect people from the economic difficulties;
Q25 – state responsibility should be to:
- provide jobs for everyone who ants to work
- provide health care for the sick;
- provide a decent standard of living for the old;
- reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?
Q34 - that the government control banks and large private enterprises;
- more jobs, less unemployment;
Q35.1 – capitalist economy – best for us
Q35.2 – capitalist economy would not help us to solve our problems
Q51.2 – people should rely on themselves, not on the state
Q51.3 and 51.11 and Q51.12 – low taxes for private entrepreneurs
Q51.4 – enterprises must be sold to foreign investors
Q51.5 – diminished role of the state in economy
Q51.6 – privatization – to divide all public property among the citizens
Q51.7 – prohibition to sell land to foreigners
Q51.8 – protectionism
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Q51.9 – important sectors of the economy  - in the hands of the state
Q51.10 – against inequality in the earnings
Q51.13 – anti-protectionism
Q51.14 – state enterprises should bankrupts as private enterprises do
Q52.1 – state should subsidize the state enterprises in order to keep working
places
Q54 – state should subsidize for –
- production of electricity
- food
- house building
- health care
Q55 – market should regulate the prices of
- electricity
- food
- house building
The EU integration index consists of the following variables:
Q60 –our problems will be solved with the European Union integration of the
country
Q61 – EU integration of Bulgaria and Romania will diminish the differences
between Western Europe and the Balkan countries
Q64 –invitation to start the negotiation for membership in the EU will improve
the financial situation of the people in Bulgaria;
 The NATO membership index contains the following variables:
Q68 and Q70 - the Bulgarian membership in NATO would be useful for the
country;
Q71 – Bulgaria has won from the fact that the government has supported the
NATO action in Kosovo.
At the end, we have to note that, in the building of multiple regression equations,
we were not interested in finding the perfect models including whatever independent
variables explaining biggest percentage of the variance, but we have chosen such
independent variables that could reveal mainly the structural and axiological
determination of our dependent variables.
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(d) Operationalization of Hypotheses
Socio-structural determinants:
We will consider the following variables as socio-structural determinants of
political support:
D2 – place of living;
D6 – full-time/part-time employment of the respondent;
D7 –place of work from the point of view of the form of property of the firm
(enterprise);
D8 – socio-occupational status;
D10 - self-evaluation of personal income according to assumed by the respondent
average income for the country;
D11 – saving opportunities
D12 – self-classification of personal social status
D13 - classification of social status of parents when respondent was 15 years old;
D14 – having private entrepreneur in the family;
P6 – self-description of financial situation of the household;
P7 – gender;
P9 – age;
P10 – education;
P12 – ethnic group;
Economic determinants:
The economy operates at two levels, the micro-economic level of the individual
and household and the macro-economic level that aggregates nationally activities of
individual and enterprises. Rose speaks about ’feel-good’ factor that concerns the micro-
economy: individuals who feel good about the economy are expected to have a positive
political outlook, and those who feel bad to be negative. We could not infer that when the
national economy is improving all will feel good, because usually some people will not
benefit. Also, even when the economy is deteriorating some people can still make profit.
Additionally, there is a time gap between the start of recovery of the economy and the
positive effect of that improvement upon personal financial status. Economic attitudes of
individuals on micro-economic level can be described as egocentric, aiming at
maximizing individual advantage, whereas evaluation of macro-economic conditions by
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people is known as sociotropic (see Rose, 1998:160-179). Both level of evaluation of
economy are considered as possible source of influence on political support.
There is a third dimension of economy assessment that is based on time – current
state of economic conditions on the two levels, future expectations for bettering of
personal financial status or national economy, and comparison with the past economic
situations.
Egocentric economic determination of political support will consist of the
following variables:
Q41.1- comparison of current household financial status with the past in two years
period;
Q41.2 – comparison of current household financial status with the past in ten
years period.
Q42.1 – future expectations of the personal and household financial status after
two years;
Q42.2 - future expectations of the personal and household financial status after ten
years;
Sociotropic economic determination of political support will consist of the
following variables:
Q44.1 – future expectation of the financial situation of all Bulgarians in two years;
Q44.2 - future expectation of the financial situation of all Bulgarians in ten years;
MARKET – market thinking index
The influence of that index on the diffuse support will signify a link between
economic attitudes and political ones. A possible way of the interpretation of that
connection, if it is positive, will indicate support for the core of the idea of democracy
which substantial element is free market. The negative effect of the market thinking index
on the support for democracy index will signify old-structures-determined relation to the
new political order.
Political /axiological/ determinants:
As political determination we will use two types of variables. The first type
reflects the mentioned above “demonstration effect” of Western democracies (European
Union), and the second reflects the acceptance of main principles of a democratic order –
support for the very idea of democratic regime used as independent variable. The former
is measured by several distinct variables:
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Q28.1 – country needs a kind of development typical of the western countries;
Q29 – through democracy the problems in our country will be solved.
European Union index
The acceptance of the main principles of democracy is measured by an index of
support for democratic regime /SD/ that consists of several variables- acceptance of
parliamentarian political system, multiparty system, free elections, freedom of opinion
expression, as well as denial of ruling the country by ‘strong hand’. That index will be
used both as dependent variable and as independent when analysing the determinants of
specific support for ruling authorities and support for economic liberalization.
Additionally, we will use another dimension influencing political support –
responsiveness of the ruling authorities (politicians) to the peoples interests and needs:
Q7 – corruption;
Comparison with the communist regime (Q14) may still have an important role in
the evaluation of diffuse and specific support adding to the generalized trust.
1-5. Determinants of political support - empirical findings
(a) Determinants of diffuse support (support for democracy - SD)
(See Table 1-1 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
The most influential factor connected with the diffuse support is the conviction
that the country needs western kind of democracy (q28.1 -.26). To that factor we could
add the effect of the confidence that, through democracy, the problems of the country will
be solved (q29 -.07), and European union integration index measuring the mass vision of
the positive effects of the future Bulgarian membership in the EU (EU + .09). These
effects clearly confirm that the demonstration effect of the Western democracies is still at
the core of the support for democratic principles. However, the relatively lower impact of
European Union integration index and the confidence that democracy will solve the
problems of the country shows a realistic popular perception about the complexity of the
mechanism of democratic rule, as well as time distance from the acceptance in EU.
The second powerful determinant of support for democracy is support for the
ruling authorities (SS + .20). As we will see later, the influence of specific support upon
the other dependent variables we want to explain is among the most substantial. The more
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the respondents support democratic regime principles, the more they support the ruling
incumbents. This indicates that support for incumbents adds to support for democratic
regime, and that an eventual diminishing of support for ruling authorities could easily
reduce support for regime principles.
The most interesting contradiction we found when analyzing diffuse support is the
negative correlation with the approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO – the more
the respondents support the democratic regime, the less they accept an eventual
membership of the country in NATO. That effect is not observed among the other
dependent variables – index of specific support, index of support for EU integration,
variable measuring the satisfaction with the present state of democracy in the country, and
the market thinking index. Thus, the negative effect of NATO membership issue upon the
support of the principle of democracy could be understood as a result of the Kosovo crisis
and NATO intervention there. It signifies that part of society holds anti-militarist stance,
which is based on purely axiological and values based motives. That issue marks a line of
potential cleavage around the NATO membership that is purely values grounded.
Another influential determinant of support for democratic principles of social
ordering is the index of market thinking (MARKET + .11). The found positive effect
means that those who support the main principles of democratic political ordering, also
accept the principles of market economy on macro-level of functioning of the social
system.
The other interesting result is connected with the effect of social structure upon
the diffuse support. There are three structural variables that delineate the socio-structural
grounds of support for democratic principles of the social order – the absence of a private
entrepreneur in the family of the respondent (d14 -.09), the financial potential of the
respondents to save part of their monthly income (d11 + .10), as well as the self-
description of the financial status of the respondents (p6 +. 06). These effects show that
support for the principles of democratic order tends to be unevenly distributed in society
among the families of private entrepreneurs, who have sufficient amount of money to live
without suffering privations, but without the financial capacity to make substantial
savings. The lack of effect of the variables reflecting monthly income on the scale “poor –
rich” (d10) shows that the supporters of the principles of democratic order are neither
among the richest, nor among the poorest social strata, but in the middle. The impact of
socio-structural effects upon the support for democratic regime shows a tendency that
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type of support to be accumulated within particular social groups, characterized by private
property and particular financial status. This is the social stratum on which support for
democratic principles mostly rely on.
Another variable adds some additional characteristic to a possible cleavage within
the society – willingness of the Bulgarians to live in another country. As we shall see
from the determinants of the other dependent variables, the effect of the aspiration to live
in another country, not in Bulgaria has appeared as a significant stratificational factor that
should be carefully analyzed. In the case of support for democracy, the more supportive to
democratic values are the respondents, the more they prefer to live in Bulgaria (q32 -.08).
That is not the case with the index of market thinking and the ‘NATO’ index, as we shall
see shortly.
Drawing the picture of the factors explaining support for democracy, we should
mention, also, the lack of effect of variables reflecting evaluation of the economic
situation in the country, and these of evaluation of household financial situation in the
three time dimensions – past, present and future.  In other words, there is no any effect of
egocentric and sociotropic economic determination upon the support for democracy. This
proves our supposition that the perception of economic perspectives is mediated by
political factors.
Also, the effect that was quite powerful at the beginning of post-communist
transformation – comparison with the previous communist regime - has disappeared now
as a factor determining support for the regime. There is, also, a lack of an effect of
evaluation of the level the corruption of the government upon the support for the regime
principles. This finding makes doubtful recently distributed arguments in the Bulgarian
public space that the rise of corruption among the ruling authorities could lead to a regime
change. An interesting fact is the absence of impact of support for regime performance
upon diffuses support. The satisfaction of the present state of democracy is not connected
with support for regime principles, which confirms our Hypothesis (2) about
inconsistency between the two objects of diffuse support. Thus, we can infer that in mass
consciousness, democratic principles do not coincide with the vision of the current state
of democratic regime in the country.
Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that support for the principles of
democratic order is axiologically and values based and thus, we can accept the Hypothesis
(1b) with the remark, that there are strong indicators showing an uneven distribution of
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diffuse support in Bulgaria among the middle social stratum - families of private
entrepreneurs with sufficient income to live without experiencing hardships.
Consequently, if determinants of regime performance are socio-structurally
determined, which we will try to check in the next paragraph, then it will be reasonable to
infer that there is a significant trend to socio-structural division of support for democracy
in Bulgaria, and that this type of political support tends to be concentrated in distinct
social groups with relatively high financial status.
Also, we reject Hypothesis (5) because there is a strong connection between
support for incumbents and support for democratic principles.
(b) Determinants of the satisfaction with the way democracy works (q3)
           (see Table 1-2 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
The most significant determinants of satisfaction with the present state of
democracy in the country is support for the ruling authorities (SS +. 34). It means that the
lower the support for the incumbents, the lower the satisfaction with the way democracy
works, and the higher the support for the ruling authorities, the more satisfied with
democracy are the Bulgarian citizens. That effect shows an interesting phenomenon about
how current stage of democracy is understood now. A near-equation between authorities
and the working of democracy exists in mass consciousness – if citizens are satisfied with
the ruling incumbents, they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Bulgaria.
There is no distinction between, on the one hand, the principles and institutions of the
democratic order, and on the other hand, the current government incumbents ruling these
institutions according to democratic principles. That effect is understandable in the light
of the political and economic changes leading from the crisis in 1996/1997 that brought
out into the office the reformist government of UDF. This government has started the
structural reforms in the country after seven years idleness. So, it seems that for mass
consciousness, democratic life of the country coincides with the new government of Ivan
Kostov. We should mention once again, that the political mobilization against the
communism has occurred quite late in Bulgaria – at the very end of 1996, and is
structurally based on the enormous economic crisis caused by the ruling of neo-
communist government of Jan Videnov (BSP). Then, it seems that the Bulgarian public
equates the policy outputs of presently ruling authorities with the quality of democratic
29
regime performance. In other words, there is a near-equation of policy outputs with
regime performance.
The next powerful variables that determine satisfaction with the way democracy
works in the country are structural and well illustrate the concentration of the satisfaction
with the Bulgarian democracy among distinct strata of society. These are variables that
indicate the financial status of respondent from the point of view of his/her means to
make savings (p6 + .10), as well as self-evaluation of personal income on the scale “poor
– rich” (d10 + .14). Thus, the higher the ability of the individuals to save part of their
personal income, and the more they define themselves as rich in comparison with the rest
of the population, the more they are satisfied with the regime performance in Bulgaria.
The self-description of the respondents as rich increases their satisfaction with the way
democracy works in the country, and is the second factor defining satisfaction with the
present state of democracy.
The third structural determinant reflects social mobility of the respondents The
higher the social status of the respondents in comparison with his/her parents when being
at the same age, the more is he/she satisfied with the way democracy works in the country
(13 + .06).
These influential structural determinants of satisfaction with the democratic
performance in Bulgaria show that approval of the present state of democratic order is
socio-structurally determined among the richest social strata that are characterized with
significant social mobility compared with the social status of their parents. Therefore,
gratification with the way democracy works in Bulgaria is unevenly distributed among the
supporters of the incumbents and the richest social groups and more socially mobile
individuals, who can be defined as winners in the process of post-communist
transformation.
There are, also, other significant determinants on satisfaction with the present
state of democracy in Bulgaria. The effect of the corruption issue (q7 + .12) as well as the
future optimist expectations of bettering the financial situation of the Bulgarians in 10
years period (q44.2 + .09) rises the approval of the present state of democracy. There is a
positive effect of support for the principles of democratic social order upon the
satisfaction with the way democracy works, but it is quite weak in comparison with the
support for the incumbents and socio-structural determinants (SD + .08). Here, the
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comparison with the past communist regime matters too (q14  + .07) and adds to the
satisfaction with the present state of the new regime.
Quite an interesting fact is the lack of an effect of Euro-Atlantic integration
perspective upon the satisfaction with the present state of the Bulgarian democracy –
indexes of support for European Union integration and NATO membership perspective.
The reason should be searched in the predominantly structural determination of the
satisfaction with regime performance which marks out well defined interests that have no
need to be supported by future oriented projective interests.
Also, there is another substantial absence – there is no effect of the index of
market thinking upon the satisfaction with the present functioning of democracy in the
country. We could guess only why this is so. One might suppose that market principles
were not involved enough in the Bulgarian post-communist social restructuring, and the
latter was shaped on the base of other stratificational mechanisms (based, for example, on
clientelist networks, or other redistributive means). Otherwise, it would be impossible to
explain why the satisfaction with the way democracy works in Bulgaria is disconnected
with the other side of the democratic equation – that of approval of market economy and
diminishing the role of the state in economy.
Therefore, we can infer that diffuse support taken from the viewpoint of its two
objects – as main principles of democracy order, and also as regime performance – tends
to be unevenly distributed among certain social strata that have sufficient income to live
without experiencing hardships. Hence, our conclusion is that there is a growing tendency
of socio-structural separation of supporters and non-supporters of the new regime, and the
main division line is financial status of the Bulgarians. The poorer individuals are less
supportive to democracy.
The absence of effects of variables capturing the ‘demonstration effect’ of
Western countries (including European Union integration index), and the lack of
correlation with the market thinking index, as well as the significant socio-structural
influence, allows us to conclude that satisfaction with the regime performance is socio-
structurally determined. Therefore, we accept Hypothesis (4)
(c) Determinants of support for the ruling authorities (specific support)
(see Table 1-3 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
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Determinants of specific support in Bulgaria at the final stage of post-communist
transformation portray the specifics of the whole peculiar period of the Bulgarian post-
communist transformation. That is why it is so important not only to analyze its sources
but, also, its connection with the support for the new regime and the level of market
oriented thinking.
Satisfaction with the current state of democracy has the strongest positive
influence upon specific support (q31 +. 24). This means that trust in ruling authorities and
satisfaction with their policy outputs is almost equated to satisfaction with the regime
performance. The more supportive to the incumbents are the respondents, the more
satisfied they are with the state of democracy in Bulgaria at the moment. The mentioned
relationship could be understood in the light of the lack of another democratic political
player represented by political party that could be an alternative to the ruling UDF
government.  Thus, the UDF is viewed as the only guarantee for the continuation of the
process of democratization that is institutionalized on political level. The other existing
parties are the still neo-communist and populist BSP and its derivative parties as the
Bulgarian Euro-left party. From that point of view, the near-equation of the approval for
incumbents and their policy outputs with the satisfaction with democratic performance in
Bulgaria proves the ontological rationality of the mass consciousness.
The second important determinant of the support for the incumbents is the NATO
membership issue – the more supportive to the authorities are the respondents, the more
they approve the idea of joining the NATO (NATO +. 17). Thus, it appears that the
division around the eventual NATO membership is not only values based, but strongly
depends on the support for the ruling party of the UDF and the president. In last account,
that party, and especially president Stoyanov, were the chief initiators of the support for
NATO during the Kosovo crisis. The political vocabulary used by them was based on the
problem of “civilizational choice” that should be made by the Bulgarian populace.
Therefore, there is another division in public opinion around the NATO issue that
goes through the support for the ruling authorities. Less supportive to the ruling party (for
example, the BSP voters) are less supportive to the perspective of joining the NATO.
That conclusion is additionally confirmed by a cluster analysis made within the
supporters of the BSP and the UDF (see Figure 1 and 2).
The third significant factor determining specific support in Bulgaria is the
comparison with the communist regime – the more dissatisfied with the communism are
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people, the more supportive to the current incumbents they are. As we have seen already
above, evaluation of the communist regime does not have an effect upon the support of
the principles of democracy and has only a weak effect upon the satisfaction with the way
democracy works in Bulgaria. This means that there is a clear understanding (vision) in
the mass consciousness that a restoration of the totalitarian order is already impossible in
Bulgaria. Therefore, neither the democratic political ordering is seen as being under
question, nor the danger of restoration exists for the mass public, but the division line
between two regimes is seen to be in the very governance. This equation of the
incumbents and their governing strategies with the democratic regime itself in mass
consciousness is in accordance with the main peculiarity of the post-communist systemic
change that depends almost entirely on the political will ‘from above’, of the ruling
political elite and its democratizing and liberalizing projects.
The next influential determinant of specific support is the approval for the
economic liberalization. The more supportive are the people to the incumbents, the more
market oriented and non-egalitarian they are (MARKET +. 14). This fact is in accordance
with the policy strategy of the ruling government itself trying to implement the delayed
economic reforms. However, an eventual diminishing of the support for the marketization
of the economy as a result of unpopular policy measures could diminish the very support
for the ruling authorities. The same strength has the effect of the corruption issue upon the
specific support – the more convinced are the people that the corruption is diminished
now, the more supportive they are (q7 + .14). Thus, the increase of the corruption would
reduce the support for the incumbents. The recent scandals about the corruption within
the very government, and the reaction of mass opinion registered by the public opinion
agencies, have confirmed that effect. However, the corruption issue touches specific
support only and has not an effect upon support for regime principles.
Diffuse support measured as principles of democratic regime, as well as support
for European Union integration have also significant effects upon the specific support.
The effect of ‘NATO’ index is higher then that of EU integration (SD +. 11; EU + .09).
This is so because the European union integration issue is not a cleavage-creating subject,
unlike the NATO membership perspective. Here, the success of the governing
incumbents to legitimize the eventual membership of the country in NATO is apparent.
There are only two socio-structural determinants that have an effect upon the
specific support – belonging to distinct ethnic groups (p12 -.08) and occupational status
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/d8 -.08/. Specific support is higher among the Bulgarian ethnic group and among the
hired workers in state enterprises and institutions and these with mixed type of property,
and is lower among the owners of private firms, managers, and self-employed individuals.
It is difficult to make a definite conclusion relying only on that finding.  We can only
hypothesize that the slowing down of the speed of economic reforms and still powerful
role of the state in economy could cause partial withdrawal of the private entrepreneurs
from support for the governing party. However, the strength of these effects upon the
support for the incumbents does not define specific support as socio-structurally
grounded.
There is a weak correlation between the comparison of the household financial
situation during the last year of communism with the current one (q41.1 -.07). The worse
the present financial status is evaluated in comparison with that ten years ago, the more
supportive to the incumbents the respondents are. This is a clear sign of existence of
generalized trust to the incumbents among the most supportive to the government
incumbents. That could be understood in the light of the peculiarities of specific support
in Bulgaria at the moment, and, particularly, through the specific role of the present
government in completion of the economic reforms. After the economic and political
crisis in 1996/1997 it has become clear for the mass public that not a kind of restoration
of the old regime is the key for bettering the economic statuses of the people in Bulgaria,
but a radical structural reform that is in the area of competence and political will of the
governing elite. So, the only way to overcome the economic crisis was represented by the
UDF governance. Citizens supporting the government incumbents are still ready to make
an advanced payment of trust in ruling authorities in order to receive in the future the
expected results of the reforms.
It is worth to discuss, also, another interesting effect upon the specific support –
that of the willingness of the Bulgarians to move abroad. The higher support for the
governing elite, the lower the wish to emigrate (q32  - .06). Therefore, trust in
government authorities and belief that they work in accordance with public interests
diminishes the willingness to move abroad, as the absence of confidence in government
raises it.
Hence, we can accept Hypothesis (3) about the presence of generalized trust on
which support for incumbents relies on.
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(d) Determinants of market thinking
(see Table 1-4 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
This index reflects the opinion of the Bulgarian populace related to the
redistributive role of the state and the market, perception of inequalities, vision of the
privatization of enterprises and preferred forms of property.
The first statement we could make is descriptive – it turned out that the mean of
support for economic liberalization index is quite lower in comparison with the other
indexes – the mean is 13.5 of maximum 33. That result supports our hypothesis about
configuration of interests in the country. What we can reckon here is that it is difficult for
the mass part of the population to reintegrate their interests into the new economic logic
of the social system for that new logic is in process of creating.  Unpopular economic
measures used in structural reforms, as well as historically rooted egalitarianism of the
Bulgarians make difficult for the bulk of people to change their old mental schemes of
perception of the role of the state as the main re-distributor of scarce goods in society.
Now we will try to find out the main determinants defining support for economic
marketization. The strongest factor, surprisingly or not, is the NATO membership issue.
The more supportive to the economic reforms are the respondents, the more they support
the idea of Bulgarian membership in NATO (NATO +. 18). The approval for NATO
membership is higher among the supporters of the liberal economic reforms and ruling
authorities, and is low among the opponents of the governing party and market economy
principles. Thus, we have marked again the division caused by the described above three
types of interests. What we can definitely say is that the old socialist type of interests
characterized by disapproval of the economic reform and the ruling government is rather
against an eventual NATO membership of Bulgaria. We do not have adequate means to
investigate by our data the attitudes of the third configuration of interests, so we would
not make a statement about them.
The second powerful effect on support for economic liberalization is the specific
support /SS + .15/ which proves that the government does not slow down the course of
structural reforms in the eyes of the supporters for economic reforms.
There is another strong effect upon the support for economic reforms that must be
analyzed carefully. This is the effect of the willingness to emigrate upon the degree of
economic liberalism – the more pro-market oriented and non-egalitarian are the
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respondents, the more they would like to live abroad (q32 -.12). In order to understand
properly that result, we should mention the effect of socio-structural determinants upon
the economic liberalization index that are quite strong. Approval of economic
liberalization is higher among the respondents who have private entrepreneur within the
family (d14 -.09), and are inhabitants of the big cities (d2 + .08), people that are working
part-time or are not working (d6 + .08), younger (p9 -.07), better educated (p10 -.06) and
predominantly male (d7 -.07).
Also, there is a positive effect of satisfaction with the present state of democracy
upon the support fir economic liberalization (q31 + .11), as well as some effect of
economic determinants. The more the respondents believe that in the long run their
financial situation (q42.2 -.06) and that of all Bulgarians (q44.2 -.09) will be better, the
more they support economic liberalization. The effect of egocentric economic
determination is weaker than the sociotropic one.
We observe, as well, an effect of comparison with the past communist regime that
is rather weak – the more dissatisfied with the previous regime are the respondents, the
more supportive to economic reforms they are (q14 +. 06). Also, there is an effect of
diffuse support upon the approval of economic liberalization (SD +. 07). What is absent
again is a correlation of European Union index upon the market thinking index. That
could be explained with the perception of the distant perspective of the Bulgarian
integration within the EU. It is difficult to suppose that support for the delayed economic
reforms would rely on projective interests, when it changes the immediate context of
people’s existence.
What we can propose as an explanation for the fact that support for economic
liberalization of the country is among the youngest, better educated and not-working
Bulgarians who prefer to live away, is connected again with the structure of interests, and
the social structure as formed during ten years of lack of economic reforms and non-
transparent redistribution of the state property into the private hands.
It seems that there is a kind of conflict between the two types of middle class that
has emerged in Bulgaria during the post-communist period - old and new one. The old
type of middle class consists of small private entrepreneurs and owners, while the mew
middle class is composed of well-educated and new technologies oriented young people
whose knowledge is convertible abroad. The effects of globalization do play a significant
role in the formation of that new middle class. However the degree of economic and
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technological development of out country hardly allows the involvement of that segment
of society within the working force of the nation. Thus, so defined ‘new middle class’ has
not sufficient perspectives of realization in Bulgaria, where petrified socio-structural
segments of different historical periods co-exists and continues to dominate the social
space. The Bulgarian society is a peculiar mixture of old socialist type segment seeking
for bigger share of state redistribution, patriarchal pre-communist segment of the oldest
people living in the smallest villages, petrified already ‘Mafia’ type segment that is so
stable due to almost ten years living under undefined rules of economic game, and the
new segment of young people with a transferable knowledge who tend to go abroad and
do not want to stay in Bulgaria. The last segment of social structure is the most supportive
to the Bulgarian economic liberalization.
(e) Determinants of the approval to European Union integration
(see Table 1-5 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
The NATO membership issue is the strongest determinant of support for the
European Union membership (NATO +. 32). In this case, we really can speak about Euro-
Atlantic integration as near-one thing despite the existing cleavages around the NATO
membership issue.
The second group of powerful determinants of the EU approval is values based
and connected with the demonstration effect of the Western democracies. The more the
respondents agree that the country needs a Western kind of democracy, the more
supportive to the integration with the EU they are (q28.1 -.16). Also, the more they
believe that the problems of the country could be solved through democracy, the more
they support to the Bulgarian membership in EU (q29 -.13). Therefore, we can infer that
approval of EU integration is a part of projective interests formation, which is proved by
the effect of long run sociotropic economic determinant upon the EU issue – the more the
respondents believe that the economic situation of the Bulgarians will improve in ten
years distance, the more they support the EU integration (q44.2 -.15). That effect is in
accordance with the observed demonstration effect of Western democracies, which is not
that much value-based as connected with the future bettering of the economic situation of
the Bulgarian population. Thus, support for EU integration is not simply values based but
is grounded on future oriented projective interests.
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There is, also, a significant effect of specific support upon the European Union
integration issue (SS +. 11). However, that effect is much stronger upon the other
dependent variables under our observation – it has stronger effect upon diffuse support
(SS +. 20), support for NATO membership (SS +. 20), the satisfaction with the way
democracy works (SS + .34), and even upon the approval of economic liberalization (SS
+ .15). Thus, we cannot explain the projective interests formed around the demonstration
effect of Western democracies and the EU integration with the legitimizing attempts of
the ruling authorities. Rather, this is the only way for a part of the population to keep its
faith in the future and to see better life perspectives. In other words – this is the only hope
for improving the life conditions that is seen by the Bulgarian population.
The effect of socio-structural determinants upon the EU integration index is rather
weak. Structural determinants that have an impact upon the EU index are gender,
ethnicity and age. Older individuals (p9 +. 05) and females (p7 + .06) are more supportive
to the Bulgarian integration in the European Union. More interesting to analyze is the
effect of ethnicity upon the EU integration perspective of the country. It turns out that the
minority ethnic groups are more supportive to the idea of the Bulgarian integration into
EU (p12 + .06). The same effect, even slightly stronger, we observe upon the NATO
membership support (p12 +. 07). Nevertheless, we argue that the explanation of these
effects has different roots. In the case of the support for the European Union integration,
the explanation could be called “the only hope”, while in the case with the NATO issue,
some ethno-nationalist prejudices are overcome by the very fact of being from different
ethnic group – Turkish or Roma. We can add the effect of membership of Turkey in
NATO that could account for the support of the Bulgarian NATO membership
perspective among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.
The weakest effects we observe among the determinants of EU integration issue
are these of diffuse support (SD +. 06),  and the satisfaction with the present state of
democracy in Bulgaria (q31 +. 06).
There is no impact of the market thinking index upon the approval of European
union integration of the country. We can read that result as a proof that support for the
Bulgarian integration in the European Union does not rely on current configuration of
interests. This fact adds to our explanation that this approval is primarily based on
projective interests. The weak effect of support for democratic principles upon the
‘European Union integration’ index confirms that it is not as much value based, but
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constitutes the core of future projective interests. Then, we can accept the Hypothesis (6)
that European Union integration issue in Bulgaria is strongly involved within the creation
of projective and future oriented public interests.
(f) Determinants of the approval of the NATO membership
(see Table 1-6 in Chapter 1 Appendix)
The most influential determinant of support for the Bulgarian membership in
NATO is the support of the European Union integration (EU +. 29). The strong
correlation between the two indexes allows us to speak about generalized attitudes to
Euro-Atlantic integration.
Other powerful determinants upon the support for NATO membership are the
indexes of specific support (SS + .20) and the market thinking index (MARKET + .20).
However, there is one peculiarity – the negative correlation with diffuse support – the
more supportive are the respondents to the idea of the Bulgarian membership in NATO,
the less they support the principles of democratic regime (DS -.11). At the same time, the
effect of the satisfaction with the present state of democracy in the country is substantially
weaker (q31 + .07). Therefore, we cannot speak about common ‘syndrome of
democracy’, but rather about a cleavage around the NATO membership issue, that is
purely value-based and is not connected with a ‘civilizational choice’ using the utterance
of the Bulgarian president Stoyanov. Actually, the Bulgarian public have already made its
‘civilizational choice’. Though, there is a cleavage around the NATO issue within that
public that is based on anti-military stances caused by still recent event of Kosovo crisis.
Another effect upon the NATO-Bulgaria issue supporting our arguments is the
comparison with the communist regime - dissatisfaction with the previous regime
strengthens the support for NATO membership (d14 +. 08). In that direction, we could
add the impact of the ‘demonstration effect’ of Western democracies upon the NATO
issue – the more respondents think that the country needs a Western kind of democracy,
the more they support the idea of joining the NATO (q28.1 -.08).
Here we should mention the interesting effect of ethnicity upon the NATO subject
according to which there is a tendency support for the NATO membership to be higher
among minority groups in Bulgaria – Turks and Roma. Another effect, socio-structural
one, adds to the understanding both of the effect of ethnicity and the low diffuse support
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upon the NATO subject in the Bulgarian society – that of education – the less educated,
the more supportive to the idea of the Bulgarian membership in NATO (p10 +. 06).
1-6. Conclusion
We will try to outline the most important trends of the political support in
Bulgaria ten years after the beginning of post-communist systemic change.
1/ Socio-structural factors have appeared as most significant determinants of
diffuse support. That finding shows the changed picture of regime support in comparison
with 1990, when support for democracy in Bulgaria was axiologically determined.
2/ There is an inconsistency between the two objects of diffuse support – on the
one hand, the main principles of democracy, and on the other hand - regime performance.
Satisfaction with the regime performance is connected mostly with support for the
incumbents and has weak connection with support for the democratic regime values.
3/ There is a near-equation of policy outputs and regime performance. That trend
could produce a negative effect upon the satisfaction with the current regime because an
eventual worsening of policy outputs could increase dissatisfaction with regime
performance.
4/ Support for the regime is not independent of specific incumbents (as should be
if it is based on generalized attachment to the values of democracy) but in significant
extent relies on support for them. Therefore, a poor authority performance could
destabilize support for the regime principles and could diminish the satisfaction with
regime performance as well.
5/ We cannot infer that support for the new regime depends only on support for
ruling authorities. Still, an ideological division exists that separates, on the one hand,
supporters for democracy and the reformist government of UDF, and, on the other hand,
these who do not approve democratic principles and are not supportive to the ruling party.
Thus, it turns out that the division line between supporters and non-supporters of the new
regime still lies on party affiliation and not on generalized attachment to democratic
values.
6/ The socio-structural determination of diffuse support shows a dangerous
tendency of uneven distribution of regime support among distinct social strata where the
main stratification factor is the personal and/or household financial status. Socio-
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structural determination upon diffuse support means that poor social strata feel alienated
form the political system. Therefore, deprivation caused by the outputs of the ruling
authorities could easily harm support for the regime.
7/ Surprisingly, specific support cannot be characterized as being determined by
socio-structural factors, as should be if the ruling government represents particular social
interests and groups, but by support for the regime itself. Actually, socio-structural
determination of specific support is mediated through the satisfaction with regime
performance.
8/ Diffuse support in Bulgaria is not yet ‘generalized attachment’ to democratic
values and regime for the whole population, firstly, because it depends strongly on
specific support and thus, on policy outputs, and secondly, it tends to be unevenly
distributed among distinct social strata. The opposite is the case with support for
government incumbents. It seems that specific support is based on generalized trust that
produce satisfaction with the regime performance.
9/ Support for the political community means attachment to the nation and is
conventionally measured by items tapping a sense of belonging to the community,
national pride and national identity (see P. Norris, 1999:11). However, we have tried to
measure support for political community by an item tapping desire to emigrate. The
results shows that the higher support for the regime principles and government
incumbents, the lower is the willingness of the Bulgarian citizens to live abroad. Thus,
high political support is correlated with high support for political community. However,
there is an opposite trend that is connected with the degree of development of market
oriented thinking among the Bulgarians. The higher is the support for economic
liberalization of the country, the lower support for political community, as measured by
us. We find out that the main reason for willingness to emigrate among the stronger
supporters of marketization of the country has to be searched not in lower political
support of that part of the population3 but in the specifics of post-communist restructuring
of the country in which de-industrialization of the last ten years coincides with post-
industrialization and globalization trend of the rest of the world. We hypothesize that, as a
result of globalization tendencies, a new ‘knowledge’ or middle strata has appeared in
Bulgaria among the younger generation that can hardly find its place in a country that still
                                                          
3 Market thinking strongly correlates with support for the government incumbents and also is connected
with diffuse support.
41
has to be modernized. Therefore, a peculiar social structure has appeared during the ten
years of post-communist transformation in which the old and new segments of interests
coexists. The problem is not as much to reintegrate the old type of interests that have been
weakened due to the economic crisis of 1996/1997, as to integrate the appeared new
generation of young people having convertible skills and widened horizon of personal
planning, as well as abilities for professional realization abroad. Thus, ten years after the
beginning of post-communist systemic change, there are not only transformative interests
in Bulgaria, but interests that go beyond the transformation period.
10/ We can infer, also, that the legitimization of the political order and the ruling
authorities is accompanied with legitimization of the economic liberalization in Bulgaria.
11/ At the end, we can conclude that projective or future oriented interests around
EU integration perspective does exists for those who cannot find other perspectives for
integration into the new economic order. These interests do not work among that part of
population, which is characterized with proper financial status and could be defined as
winners in the process of post-communist transformation. Being a part of the political
program of the UDF, that legitimation strategy of the ruling government is successful.
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1-7. Chapter 1 Appendix
Independent variables used in linear regression analyses
D2 – place of living;
D6 – full-time/part –time working                                                              
D7- place of working;
D8 – socio-occupational status;
D10 - self-evaluation of personal income                                                    
D11 – saving opportunities                                                                          
D12 – self-classification of personal social status
D13 - social status of parents when respondent was 15 years old;
D14 – having private entrepreneur in the family;
P6 – self-description of household finance;
P7 – gender;
P9 – age;
P10 – education;
P12 – ethnic group;
Q41.1- household finance in past two years
Q41.2 –household finance in past ten years
Q42.1 – expected household finance in two years;
Q42.2 - expected household finance in ten years;
Q44.1 –expected finance of all Bulgarians in two years;
Q44.2 – expected finance of all Bulgarians in ten years;
Q28.1 – country needs a Western kind development;
Q29 –democracy will solve the problems in our country;
Q32 – want to live abroad
Q31 – satisfaction with current state of democracy in the country;
Q7 – corruption
Q14 – satisfaction with communist regime
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/
MARKET - market thinking index
EU – approval of the Bulgarian integration into European Union;
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NATO- approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO
Table 1-1
Determinants of Support for Principles of Democratic Regime*
                                                                                            BETA
D11 – saving opportunities                                                                             .10
D14 – having private entrepreneur in the family;                               -.09
P6 – self-description of household finance;                                        .06
Q28.1 – country needs a Western kind development;                         -.26
Q29 –democracy will solve the problems in our country;                      -.07
Q32 – want to live abroad                                                                             -.08
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/                          .20
MARKET - market thinking index                                         .11
EU – approval of the Bulgarian integration into EU;                     .09
NATO- approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO                          -.16
                                                         2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 27%
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases:
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
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Table 1-2
Determinants of Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in the Country/D3/*
/Regime Performance/
                                                                                          BETA
D13 - social status of parents when respondent 15 years old;                .06
D10 - self-evaluation of personal income                                       .14
D6 – full-time/part –time working                                                               .10
Q7 – corruption;                                                                                            .12
Q14 – satisfaction with communist regime;                                                 .07
Q42.2 - expected household finance in ten years;                              .09
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order                              .08
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/                         .34
                                                        2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 36 %
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases:
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
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Table 1-3
Determinants of Specific Support*
                                                                                      BETA
D8 – socio-occupational status;   -.08
P12 – ethnic group;                                                                           -.08
Q7 – corruption;                                                                                .14
Q14 – satisfaction with communist regime;                                     .15
Q32 – want to live abroad                                                                 -.06
Q41.1- household finance in past two years                                    -.07
Q31 – satisfaction with current state of democracy                          .24
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order                 .11
MARKET - market thinking index                                        .14
EU – approval of the Bulgarian integration into EU;                 .09
NATO- approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO              .17
                                                        2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 59 %
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases: 1200
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
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Table 1-4
Determinants of Economic Liberalism*
                                                                            BETA
D2 – place of living; .08
D6 – full-time/part –time working; .08
D14 – having private entrepreneur in the family; -.09
P7 – gender; -.07
P9 – age; -.07
P10 – education; -.06
Q7 – corruption; .06
Q14 – satisfaction with communist regime;                                              .06
Q42.2 - expected household finance in ten years;                         -.06
Q44.2 – expected finance of all Bulgarians in ten years;                 -.09
Q32 – want to live abroad;                                                                        .12
Q31 – satisfaction with current state of democracy in the country;        .11
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order;                         .07
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/                      .15
NATO- approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO                        .18
                                                             2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 56 %
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases: 1200
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
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Table 1-5
Determinants of Support for European Union Integration*
                                                                               BETA
P7 – gender;                                                                   .06
P9 – age;                                                                                .05
P12 – ethnic group;                                                                              .05
Q28.1 – country needs a Western kind development;                 -.16
Q29 –democracy will solve the problems in our country;                   -.13
Q44.2 – expected finance of all Bulgarians in ten years;                   -.15
Q31 – satisfaction with current state of democracy;                             .06
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order;                    .06
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/                  .11
NATO- approval of the Bulgarian membership in NATO                   .32
                                                       2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 47 %
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases: 1200
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
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Table 1-6
 Determinants of Support for the Bulgarian Membership in NATO*
                                                                                  BETA
P10 – education;                                                                                  .06
P12 – ethnic group;                                                                          .07
Q14 – satisfaction with communist regime;                                     .08
Q28.1 – country needs a Western kind development;              -.08
Q31 – satisfaction with current state of democracy;                         .07
Q32 – want to live abroad;                                                                .08
SD – index of support for principles of democratic order;             -  .11
SS – index of specific support /support for incumbents/               .20
MARKET - market thinking index                                                 .20
EU – approval of the Bulgarian integration into EU                   .29
                                                       2
Variance explained: adj. R   : 51 %
All beta statistics significant at <.001 level
Number of cases: 1200
* Only significant beta coefficients are reported
Figure 1
Orientations to NATO and EU
among the supporters of the UDF
Figure 2
Orientations to NATO and EU
among the supporters of the BSP
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Chapter 2. Economic attitudes after ten years of transition
2-1. The importance of fundamental economic beliefs
Only the last three of the more than ten years of economic transition in Bulgaria
have experienced a pace and quality of reforms which have been evaluated as satisfactory
by different international organizations. However, the country has not experienced a
visible growth tendency, and the public is yet to reap the benefits of the transition to
market democracy.
The relative lack of success in the economic reforms in Bulgaria, especially in the
light of the quick political reform and establishment of democracy1, is in stark contrast
with the dynamics of economic reforms in the countries of Central Europe. At the same
time, and despite of its relative backwardness, over the last several years Bulgaria has
emerged as one of the Southeast European regional leaders in transition. This poses the
interesting question whether the slow economic transition may be due to factors other
than the ones neoclassical economic theory would tend to stress.
Whether this question will be posed using the economic phraseology of the
“second transition”2, or using the political science concept of “weak states”3, it involves
looking at variables quite different from the ones traditionally used by neoclassical
analysis. Namely, it involves looking at the way the economic activity in the society is
structured. It demands accounting for elements of the economic reality, which the
traditional analysis usually takes for granted. The institutional scaffolding and the
underlying beliefs of economic agents shaping the incentives in economic life are among
the most important fundamentals which cannot be assumed away in the context of
transition in Southeastern Europe.
While the institutional environment has been subject to an increasing number of
studies, and the importance of the insights of the new institutional economics has been
more and more widely recognized, the fundamental beliefs of the Bulgarians about how
the economy works have not been studied. The purpose of this study is to use the results
                                               
1 The European Commission has recognized Bulgaria as a functioning democracy as early as 1998, but its
recognition as a fully functioning market economy is still in the future.
2 See Blanchard, 1997.
3 See V. Ganev, 1999.
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of a survey based on a representative cluster sample of all Bulgarian population over 18
years of age that has been collected in February 2000 to shed some first light on these
issues. Before the results are reported and analyzed, however, the relevance of the issues
in question for economic development need to be underlined.
Optimization is assumed to be a fundamental driving force of economic behavior.
Economic agents take certain actions with the goal to achieve an outcome they consider
as desirable. This means that they are convinced in some cause-effect relationship
between the actions and the outcomes. More generally, economic agents have mental
models about the workings of the economic systems. Since the world has many different
explanations, the mental models may be quite different. What mental model a given
economic agent subscribes to is one of the determinants of the actions she takes, and from
there of the observed microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. Thus a link between
mental models and development is theoretically thinkable and empirically testable.
The concept of a mental model is, however, too general to be ready for
straightforward analysis. It requires expertise not only from economics, but from
sociology, biology, medicine, cognitive science, and possible other fields of knowledge.
Therefore, the first steps towards building even a remote understanding of the economic
thinking of the members of a given society require simplification and the selection of
only a small number of dimensions to be studied.
The context of transition from plan to market suggests two such dimensions which
are particularly interesting. The first is the thinking along the cooperation - non-
cooperation axis. The communist experience involved a concerted effort to ingrain the
conviction that the world is non-cooperative. Among the centerpieces of the communist
description of reality are surplus value, exploitation, class struggle, imperialism. All of
them are non-cooperative explanations of the world, and involve the conviction that the
only way for some to become rich is at the expense of others. It is logical to assume that
this way of thinking has proceeded after the beginning of transition, especially in the
countries where the old elites managed to preserve their positions and adopted as their
dominant project the appropriation of resources from the state. Whether an economic
agent believes that the world is cooperative or not is important for the decision she makes
and from there for her actions shaping the economic reality.
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The second interesting dimension of the way of thinking after communism is the
thinking about the balance between the market and the state. Whether the market or the
state should be the main instrument for resource allocation at different margins is a
question whose answer affects the actions of economic agents, and from there their
demands and expectations about the government and its policies.
Once these two basic dimensions of economic thinking are measured, the results
can be used to make inferences about correlation between different descriptive variables
of the population and economic thinking, as well as to check if the variable representing
economic thinking can contribute to the explanation of public attitudes on different
issues.
2-2. Cooperative vs. non-cooperative thinking
Cooperation is economically relevant and important. It lowers transaction costs
and thus helps expand the market interactions, improve resource allocation, enhance
investment in various forms of capital and increase overall factor productivity in the long
run. Conversely, the lack of cooperation leads to high transaction costs, to high
uncertainty, to inability to channel resources to their most productive use, and to
significant barriers to development. Therefore whether the culture in a society is
conducive for cooperation or not is a question whose answer can provide useful insight
into the development prospects of this society.
The answer to the question whether the Bulgarians are inclined to think
cooperatively requires some theorizing. It is necessary because asking simple
straightforward questions about cooperation will not lead to representative results and
respondents may not give genuine answers. In a sense asking directly about cooperation
will almost certainly find out that this notion is popular, but will tell nothing about
whether people really think cooperatively.
This problem is approached using game theory. It allows to define “cooperation”
as choosing a “don’t confess” strategy in a prisoner’s dilemma setting4, which abstractly
                                               
4 Clarity demands a brief description of the prisoners’ dilemma. Two criminals are captured, held in
separate cells, and questioned. If both confess, they choose non-cooperation (because they admit that the
other is guilty) and receive a small punishment. If both do not confess (cooperate), they are both let free
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describes the interaction between an individual economic agent and the rest of the world.
This construct involves two levels of beliefs. First, the economic agent believes she is in a
game allowing for a positive outcome for both her and the world. Second, the economic
agent chooses a cooperative strategy within this game, because she believes it to be
optimal and (or) desirable.
The first level of belief is a relatively simple choice between believing in a zero
(or less) sum world, or in a positive sum world. If a person believes in a zero sum world,
a cooperative strategy is never optimal, and a rational choice should be not to cooperate.
An important note here is the necessity to distinguish between a belief what the world
should be, and a belief what the world actually is. The results of the survey definitely
suggest that while the majority of the respondents think the world should be characterized
by positive sum interactions, they are firmly convinced that the Bulgarian reality is not a
positive sum one. So, at the first level, finding out the extent to which the respondents
believe that the reality is a positive sum one or not goes a long way towards indicating
whether they are inclined to choose cooperative actions.
The second level of belief is a more complex strategic choice within a positive
sum game. There are many determinants of such a choice, and designing questions
covering all of them is beyond the scope of the survey, whose task is to provide a general
framework and initial evidence. However, one of the game-theoretic results which holds
in almost all settings is that long term thinking5 facilitates cooperation by making it an
optimal strategy. Thus, at the second level, finding out whether respondents value the
future highly or are concerned primarily with the present and are ready to solve present
day problems at the expense of future value flows will also contribute to a large extent to
the understanding of their inclination to choose cooperative actions.
Quantifying such beliefs is, of course, not easy. It was achieved through bundles
of different questions, the answers of which were appropriately scaled and summed up to
a single variable. The questions try to capture whether the respondents are inclined to
                                                                                                                                           
with a small compensation. If one confesses, and the other does not, the one who confesses is let free and
gets a large reward, while the other one receives a severe sentence.
5 In terms of economics, this translates into putting a high value on the future, or, technically, into having a
rate of time discount close to one, giving approximately equal weights to present and future flows of value.
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disregard long term problems associated with short term actions6, or whether they
consider the economy as a zero-sum game.
The answers (the Cronbach alpha is 0.84) are assigned numerical values such that
the least cooperative and the short-term oriented answers take the value of 0, and the
most cooperative and long-term oriented answers take the value of 100, with the
intermediate answers obtaining values such that the intervals between them are equal.
Then all these numerical values are summed up, and the sum is divided by the number of
questions. Naturally, such an approach raises the question whether the “distances”
between the different answers is indeed equal, and whether some answers should not
obtain more weight in the sum. Any answer to such questions would involve complex
economic theorizing, which is beyond the scope of the paper. Suffice it to say that the
formal modeling of people’s beliefs and of the importance of beliefs for the economy is
still far from providing operational answers to these questions.
The final result of the data transformation is a single variable, taking values
between 0 and 100, and reflecting the respondents’ level of cooperative thinking. A value
of 0 means a firm belief that the economy is a zero sum game and that short term
concerns should dominate the decision making process, resulting in the evaluation that
the respective respondent has a very low level of cooperative thinking. A value of 100
reflects exactly the opposite – it means that the respondent has selected the answers
indicating a belief that the economy allows for a positive sum interaction and that the
long run matters, resulting in a high level of cooperative thinking.
The results for the variable, called COOP, show a mean value of 39.30 with a
standard deviation 14.03. The actual values range from 0 to 93, indicating that the
questions and the scaling have led to a relatively realistic result. The hypothesis that the
distribution around the mean is normal is rejected (Jarque-Bera statistic of 36.78) – the
lower values are lumped together, while the distribution thins out at the higher values.
The overall evaluation is that the mean is low, despite the relatively high level of
dispersion of values. This means that non-cooperative thinking is prevalent in the
Bulgarian society.
                                               
6 Some examples would include the usual dichotomy “inflation today – unemployment later” or “budget
support today – budget deficits later”.
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Given the overall low value of the index of cooperative thinking, there are some
significant distinctions within the population. Thus, the index is more than 5 points higher
for people from the large cities than for people from small towns and villages. The index
is more than 9 points higher for people with higher education relative to people with less
than high school education. Interestingly, the index is 10 points higher for people who
have a private entrepreneur in their family than for people who do not.
These observations give enough ground for an attempt to check formally the
statistical relationship between the index of cooperative thinking and some other
variables, generally describing the population. Table 2-1 presents the results of a simple
linear regression of the index of cooperative thinking on a constant term and on five
descriptive variables, which proved to have statistical significance under different
specifications. These variables are: “religious”, which reflects the respondent’s level of
religiousness (0 for very religious and 5 for non-religious distrusting the church);
“workplace”, which captures seven different professional positions, ordered according to
the degree of personal decision-making power (ranging from 0 for unemployed or not
working to 6 for a free professional); “social group” according to the self identification of
the respondent (0 for working class to 4 for upper class); “entrepreneur” is a variable
reflecting whether there is an entrepreneur in the family of the respondent (value of 0) or
not (value of 1); and “education” reflecting the degree of the respondent’s education (0
for higher education to 4 for lower than elementary education).
Table 2-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable COOP
Independent
variable
Coefficient
estimate t-statistic
Standardized
coefficient
Constant 56.900 15.631 -
Religious -1.113 -2.974 -0.085
Workplace 0.953 3.552 0.112
Social group 1.752 3.624 0.107
Entrepreneur -7.249 -4.957 -0.149
Education -1.910 -4.718 -0.142
Observations: 1121 Adjusted R2: 0.090 F-statistic: 23.159
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As can be seen from the results, despite the relatively low explanatory power of
this ad hoc model, the inferences are quite indicative. The results most to be expected is
that the lower the education and the lower the religiousness, the lower the level of
cooperative thinking. Also, quite in concert with the general intuition, the degree to
which a person is responsible for making decisions (free professionals and people
working for the family firm being at the top) is directly related to the willingness to
cooperate. Richer people also exhibit a higher level of cooperative thinking, even though
it is difficult to tell at this stage the direction of the causation – whether they are rich
because they are more inclined to engage in the more productive cooperative interaction,
or that they are inclined to cooperate because they are rich and have a larger safety
margin. Finally, having an entrepreneur in the family is also strongly related to
cooperative thinking. This may be confidently attributed to the fact that a personal
contact with somebody who regularly enters into business interaction raises the
awareness for the importance of reaching compromises and of having trustworthy
partners.
Actually, as shown by the standardized coefficients which allow for comparisons
between the relative importance of the different variables, having an entrepreneur in the
family has the strongest effect on the level of cooperative thinking of all variables in this
specification (it is almost twice as important as religiousness). This result underlines the
importance of having more and more people experience the pangs of entrepreneurship for
the long term development prospects of the economy. Since entrepreneurial experience
on a mass level is possible only through small and medium size enterprises, this result
gives additional weight to the contribution of the small and medium enterprise sector for
achieving sustainable economic development.
It is worth mentioning that two variables which intuitively may seem important in
terms of their potential to predict cooperative thinking are not statistically significant
under various specifications of the model. They are age and place of residence. For the
residence variable (ranging from 0 for villages to 4 for large cities), there seems to exist
some indication that it may be non-linearly related to cooperative thinking. This is due to
the fact that some of the traditional cooperative behavior related to the agricultural
tradition and the patriarchal family remains in the villages, while there is less of it left in
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the small towns, which were among the places hit the hardest by the transition process.
Even more intriguingly, age obviously plays no role in predicting cooperative thinking,
and the present data do not give ground to infer that belonging to a specific generation
matters for the level of cooperative thinking.
The general conclusion7 from the analysis of the level of cooperative thinking in
Bulgaria is that it is low and that among its significant determinants are education and
entrepreneurial experience. However, even among the more educated and entrepreneurial
respondents (a relatively small proportion of the population), the index of cooperative
thinking is not necessarily high. The overall evaluation is that the Bulgarians are not
inclined to think cooperatively. Given this dominant perception, cooperative actions are
relatively rare in reality, and this is a major hurdle to resolving fundamental development
problems.
2-3. State vs. market orientation
The second intriguing dimension of economic thinking in the transition context,
besides the cooperation dimension, is the resource allocation mechanism dimension. This
dimension is more traditional and more thoroughly studied from different points of view.
It is particularly important for transition countries due to their heritage from the period of
economic planning and command administrative system, when resource allocation was
dismally inefficient, but when some level of personal security for individuals was
guaranteed. Under socialism, the stated supplied various goods and services at non-
market prices, and market reforms necessarily have to change this status quo, which may
be interpreted by many as a loss of entitlement and rejected as a less desirable option.
On the other hand, the choice between market and state in post-communism
influences the prospects for economic development. Sustainable development cannot be
achieved without the establishment of a mechanism for resource allocation which has
significantly higher efficiency that the central plan. This means establishment and
expansion of market mechanisms with all their inequities and different inherent costs.
                                               
7 Of course, this conclusion is only indicative of possible relationships. As reflected in the low explanatory
power of this model, there needs to be more theoretical formalization.
57
As opposed to measuring cooperative thinking, the measurement of the inclination
to rely on the state or on the market is not so theoretically involved. The index of market
thinking is prepared in the same manner as the index of cooperative thinking. The
questions comprising the index attempt to cover a wide range of topics. The more
important among them are the issues of income inequality, of taxation, of government
control over certain activities. Questions about the preferences with respect to the
prevalent form of property and with respect to provision of goods and services by the
state are also used. The answers were scaled to have values between 0 (for the most state
oriented option) and 100 (for the most market oriented option) with equal distance
between the different options. The results for the individual questions after the scaling are
summed up and the sum is divided by the number of questions. Again, assuming equal
distances between answers and equal weights of different questions is justified only by
technical convenience and as a first approximation.
The data transformation just described yields a single variable, taking values
between 0 and 100, and reflecting the respondents’ level of preference for market
interaction. A value of 0 means that the respondent prefers the state mechanisms for
resource allocation, for provision of certain goods and services, for decision making. A
value of 100 means that the respondent reflects a preference for market interaction and a
high level of reliance on horizontal relations with all their efficiency and risks.
The results for the variable, called MARKET, show a mean value of 41.81 with a
standard deviation 14.52. The actual values range from 5 to 94, again indicating that the
questions and the scaling have led to a relatively realistic result. Even though the
distribution of this variable is closer to normal relative to the distribution of COOP, the
hypothesis that the distribution around the mean is normal is rejected (Jarque-Bera
statistic of 8.10). Similarly to COOP, but to a lesser degree, the lower values are lumped
together, while the distribution thins out at the higher values. The overall evaluation is
that the mean is low, despite the relatively high level of dispersion of values. This means
that preferences for state leadership and intervention in the economy, or non-market
thinking, are prevalent in the Bulgarian society.
As in the case of the index of cooperative thinking, the general data on the
population provide the opportunity to establish statistical relationships between the level
of market thinking and other population variables. Table 2-2 presents the results of a
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simple linear regression of the index of market thinking on a constant term and on six
descriptive variables. These variables are: “residence”, reflecting the place of residence
(ranging between 0 for village and 4 for a large city); the already introduced “workplace”,
“social group”, “entrepreneur”, and “education”; and “birth year”, indicating the year of
the respondent’s birth (the oldest respondent being born in 1904, and the youngest in
1983).
Table 2-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable MARKET
Independent
variable
Coefficient
estimate t-statistic
Standardized
coefficient
Constant 43.800 10.747 -
Residence 1.266 4.107 0.126
Workplace 1.400 4.926 0.162
Social group 1.841 3.591 0.106
Entrepreneur -9.146 -6.195 -0.183
Education -1.581 -3.584 -0.116
Birth year 0.212 7.973 0.252
Observations: 898 Adjusted R2: 0.286 F-statistic: 61.037
This specification has a higher explanatory power than the one estimating the
determinants of cooperative thinking, and provides interesting contrasts. First, the
variable “religion” is dropped out, because it does not have explanatory power for the
index of market thinking. Second, the variables for residence and for age are statistically
significant when predicting the market thinking.
Given the context of transition, all variables have the expected signs. The larger
the place of residence, the higher the social status, and the higher the education, the
stronger the inclination for market thinking. Again, occupations involving more decision
making and participation are related to lower desire to rely on the state. Having an
entrepreneur in the family also contributes to the desire for the state to leave more room
to the market. Age enters the specification strongly and significantly – the older the
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person, the higher the desire to rely on the state for the provision of goods and services
and for decision making.
The standardized coefficients show that the age variable has the strongest effect
on the level of market thinking – its effect is twice as powerful as the one of place of
residence and more than twice that of social status and of education. This is especially
interesting in light of the finding that age has no explanatory power for the level of
cooperative thinking. One possible explanation for this result is that people perceive the
interaction through the state as neither more nor less conducive for cooperation than
interaction through the market. In other words, non-cooperative strategies are perceived
as equally successful when dealing with the state as they are when dealing in the markets.
Coupled with the combined effect of the variables reflecting entrepreneurial
experience and personal responsibility, the established effect of age on market thinking
allows a speculation about the possible future dynamic of the index. As the inevitable
generational change in Bulgaria proceeds, and as entrepreneurial experience inevitably
accumulates as a result of the already changed structure of property and of economic
interaction, the value of the index should increase, and the overall orientation will be
increasing towards the market. Once again, the contribution of experiences gained
through involvement in small and medium size enterprises, including family business and
micro enterprises, is of great importance.
The general conclusion from the analysis of the level of market thinking in
Bulgaria is that it is low, and that among its major determinants are age and
entrepreneurial experience. Nevertheless, the medium and longer term perspective for
market thinking is towards an increase, due to the change in generations and to the
accumulation of market experience. The presently low level of market thinking is an
impediment to development due to the fact that transition requires expansion of market
interaction and withdrawal of the state from large areas of activity. However, this
impediment may be expected to decrease in importance in a medium term perspective.
2-4. Clustering along the two dimensions
The indices of cooperative and market thinking allow for situating the nationally
representative sample in a “cooperation-market thinking” space defined by the two
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scales. Due to missing values for some of the respondents, the overall number of
observations is 934. The results are shown on Figure 1.
Figure 1. Cooperative and Market Thinking in Bulgaria: Scatter Plot and Clusters
The left side of Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the individual cooperative and
market thinking indices of the respondents. The first thing which is immediately obvious
is the correlation between the two indices: people who have high scores for cooperative
thinking also rank high in terms of market thinking, and vice versa. The correlation
between the two indices is 0.602 and is highly statistically significant. Despite this
correlation, the spreading of the data points in the scatter plots suggests that there is a
wide variety of combinations of cooperative and market thinking for different people.
This fact gives ground for an attempt to group the respondents into different types.
The grouping is achieved through a hierarchical clustering procedure, which establishes
the existence of four distinct clusters among the respondents. The four groups can be
described in the following manner.
The first group consists of people (213 people, or 22.8 percent of the total), who
are firmly convinced that the world is a place where cooperation is a losing strategy, and
who tend to rely dominantly on the state to solve problems and take care of things. None
of the respondents falling into this group score higher than the national average in
cooperative thinking (indices ranging between 3 and 37, average 22.50), and only two
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score higher than the national average in market thinking (ranging between 5 and 49,
average 25.74). More than 90 percent of the members of this group depend on the state
(unemployed, retired, working in fully state owned firms), and more than three quarters
define themselves as belonging to the working class. Two thirds are 50 years of age or
older, half of them live in villages and towns with less than 20,000 population, and only
one in ten has higher education. Capturing the most encompassing characteristic of this
group, it is named “dependents”. It means that members of this group demand things
from the state, while at the same time they are not ready to share risks and offer
cooperation.
The second, and most numerous (533 people, or 57.1 percent of the total), group
dominates the landscape. It includes people who are generally representative for the
country, and most descriptive variables take values around the national averages. The
index of cooperative thinking for the group ranges between 17 and 68 (average 38.98),
while the index of market thinking ranges from 16 to 70 (average of 41.15). The
occupation, education, age, residence and class identification profiles of this group
coincide with the national profiles almost one to one. Therefore, it may be regarded as
truly representative of the nation. Its situation in the cooperation-market thinking space
suggests its name – “conservatives”, who have not ventured yet into the new and yet
unknown and little experienced territories of cooperative efforts and market interactions.
The third group consists of 143 people (15.3 percent of the total). Half of them are
below the age of 40, and also half identify themselves as members of the middle or upper
classes. More than half live in cities with population above 100,000, while 30 percent
have had education beyond high school. Almost 40 percent work in the fully private
sector (private firms, family firms, free professionals), while one third do not work
(retired or unemployed) and only one quarter work in the state sector. Interestingly, 20
percent of the members of this group have an entrepreneur in the family, while the
national average is 9 percent. For the group as a whole, the index of cooperative thinking
ranges between 38 and 63, with an average of 49.91, and the index of market thinking
ranges between 49 and 78, with an average of 60.05. Again, taking into account this
position of the group, it is called the group of “cautious tasters”. These are people who
have a general trust in the market, but who are not ready to offer cooperation first, and
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will need some convincing and experience before venturing into more involved, but also
more productive mode of behavior.
The last group is the small bunch (45 people, or 4.8 percent of the total) of
believers in cooperation and in the market. For them, the index of cooperative thinking
ranges between 60 and 93, with an average of 72.63, while the index of market thinking
ranges between 53 and 94, with an average of 67.39. The overall profile of this group is
very similar to the profile of the cautious tasters, with three significant exceptions. First,
only one in ten members of the group is employed in the state sector. Second, almost one
third of this group lives in towns with population between 20,000 and 100,000. Third,
more than 36 percent of the members of this group have an entrepreneur in the family.
This means that a significant part of this group are relatively young and relatively highly
educated people, who have ventured into the private sector in towns which are big
enough for viable business, but small enough for the relatively easy establishment of
productive cooperative relationships through repeated interactions with known people.
Another interesting observation is that despite the small size of this group, its members
are people with quite diverse backgrounds, which shows that their behavioral traits may
be repeated throughout the country, and that their view of the world is not isolated in
certain segments of society.
The fact that this is the only group for which the average index of cooperative
thinking is higher than the index of market thinking gives some more food for thought.
The group is obviously not radical in its belief in the market, and is ready to recognize
the necessity of state interventions. On the other hand, these people are more inclined to
believe, that cooperation is the appropriate background for things to be done. For these
reasons this group is called the group of “outgoing marketers”.
The overall conclusion from looking at the positioning of the Bulgarian society
along the cooperation-market thinking space is that the public attitudes are not generally
conducive for economic development, but that the situation is not desperate. Some of the
social dynamics, as well as the characteristics and the profiles of some of the different
clusters of people in society suggest that positive changes may occur of the present
processes of economic reform, of empowering of the private sector, and of improvements
in governance continue and become more comprehensive.
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2-5. An application: fundamental attitudes and EU/NATO support
The results obtained so far allow for checking whether fundamental attitudes
based on mental models of the world take part in shaping more short-term attitudes on
specific issues. Since the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration dominate the Bulgarian
agenda at the present time, the question whether the indices of cooperative an market
thinking help explain support for EU and NATO integration is a natural candidate for
consideration. It is a question which attempts to establish a link between fundamental
attitudes and more current processes on the surface of social life.
Tables 1-5 and 1-6 show the results of an analysis of the same issue based on the
consideration of determinants of political support. Here the scope is narrowed to see if the
two indices attempting to describe fundamental attitudes are relevant. For this purpose,
the composite indices of support of EU and for NATO, which are obtained in very much
the same manner as the indices of economic thinking, are combined into a single index of
support for Euro-Atlantic integration. This is justified due to the high positive correlation
of 0.54 between the index of EU integration support and the index of NATO integration
support. The two indices of integration support are then combined into one variable,
named EU/NATO. It is scaled to take values between 0 and 100, and for the national
sample ranges between 41 and 97, with an average of 76.08 and a standard deviation of
12.50.
After analyzing several specifications, and after the exclusion of variables which
lose their statistical significance, the joint EU/NATO variable is regressed on a set of
variables already used for previous regressions: “religious”, “residence”, “entrepreneur”,
“education”, “birth year”. To this regression are added the two indices COOP and
MARKET. It is precisely their addition which, due to correlation, renders the variables
“workplace” and “social group” statistically insignificant. The results of the regression
are reported in Table 2-3.
64
Table 2-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable EU/NATO
Independent
variable
Coefficient
estimate t-statistic
Standardized
coefficient
Constant 22.400 4.689 -
Religious -1.819 -5.127 -0.124
Residence -0.682 -1.978 -0.052
Entrepreneur 2.826 1.699 0.042
Education -1.488 -3.047 -0.083
Birth year 0.069 2.360 0.063
COOP 0.121 2.994 0.090
MARKET 0.801 18.021 0.607
Observations: 909 Adjusted R2: 0.487 F-statistic: 124.371
The results of the regression confirm the relevance of fundamental beliefs for the
support of current political processes. The only relatively surprising finding is the
negative coefficient of the “residence” variable, which may reflect the already mentioned
fact that the specification of this variable allows for nonlinear dynamics in terms of
values and attitudes. Another interesting finding is the strong relevance of the “religious”
variable, indicating that integration is supported more by relatively more religious people,
even after the effects of cooperative thinking (which also depends on religiousness – see
Table 2-1) are taken into account.
The regression results also indicate that the it is the index of market thinking
which has the strongest effect in shaping the support for Euro-Atlantic integration.
According to the comparison between the standardized coefficients, its effect outweighs
the combined effects of all other determinants. This means that the dynamic processes,
determining the medium and longer term perspective of the level of market thinking in
the Bulgarian society, may be expected to have a very direct and significant effect on the
support for Euro-Atlantic integration. Thus generational changes and the accumulation of
market and entrepreneurial experience in Bulgaria will lead to deeper support for the
integration processes which the country has already started. This will be a tendency
which will counterbalance the inevitable skepticism about integration which other
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transition countries have already experienced and which most probably will be noticed in
Bulgaria too.
2-6. Concluding remarks
The study of economic developments during transition in Southeastern Europe
poses significant challenges to traditional neoclassical approaches. The determinants of
economic dynamics are often deeper and more difficult to grasp and measure than the
variables used in the context of the more developed world. One such determinant, which
shapes the actions of economic agents, are their fundamental beliefs about how the
economy works and about which mechanism for resource allocation is preferable.
This study makes a first attempt to provide a measure of this important
determinant in the case of Bulgaria. The method used is analysis of the results of a
nationally representative survey of attitudes. The attempt concentrates on the
measurement of the inclination for cooperative actions, and of the degree of reliance on
the state vs. the market.
The results are that the levels of both measures indicate that people in Bulgaria are
not inclined to cooperate and prefer the state as the dominant resource allocating
mechanism. The ways of thinking along these two dimensions most sensitive to the level
of education and to the presence of entrepreneurial experience, and to a smaller extent to
the level of education, religiousness, place of residence, perceived social status. These
two measures also allow the identification of four distinct groups of people, clustered
according to their way of thinking. While large proportions of the people are conservative
or plainly dependent on state provision, there are groups of people who are willing to take
a more liberal and cooperative approach to their economic interactions. As these more
conducive for economic development groups are not socially isolate and are spread
throughout different social contexts, and since they enjoy some generational and
entrepreneurial advantages, they have the potential of becoming the groups which define
the business culture. Whether these favorable dynamics will take place remains to be
seen, but it may be claimed that they will depend on the continuation of reforms and on
the general improvement of governance in Bulgaria.
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Finally, the measures of fundamental economic attitudes prove to be valuable
predictors of support for more current issues on the political and economic agenda, such
as the integration in EU and NATO.
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